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IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO, AND TO MEDIATE:
LEGAL CULTURAL AND OTHER FACTORS
INFLUENCING UNITED STATES AND LATIN




This article examines legal cultural and other factors influenc-
ing the resistance to mediating commercial disputes displayed by U.S.
and Latin American lawyers.  After surveying current contexts in
which commercial mediation occurs in the United States and in Latin
American countries and summarizing data regarding commercial ac-
tors’ knowledge of the benefits of mediating, it analyzes the relatively
infrequent use of mediation despite its potential advantages over adju-
dicating.  Focusing on lawyers, the article next explores factors that
influence U.S. and Latin American lawyers when they converse with
commercial clients about selecting dispute resolution methods.  Ana-
lyzing similarities arising from universal decision-making biases and
shared legal cultural traditions, and differences flowing from common
law and civil system influences, this article argues that all of these
factors strongly influence U.S. and Latin American lawyers toward ad-
judicating and explains why mediation is not used more often to re-
solve commercial disputes.  This article concludes by presenting
reasons why carefully assessing mediation as a pre-adjudication op-
tion helps lawyers counter perceptual, decision-making, and legal cul-
tural biases while allowing commercial clients to avoid the risks and
substantial transaction costs inherent in adjudicating disputes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial relationships create substantial economic activity
through licensing, distributor, supplier, joint venture, and other trans-
actional arrangements.  Changes in economic, market, and other cir-
cumstances occur after these relationships begin, however, and often
produce differing performance-related perceptions and contractual in-
terpretations.  These differences may generate disagreements regard-
ing responsibilities, obligations, performances, and entitlements that
may escalate into commercial disputes.1  Because such commercial dis-
putes are increasing,2 choosing how to confront and resolve them sup-
plies important tasks for lawyers and their commercial clients in the
United States and Latin America.
Lawyers and their commercial clients have a limited menu of
dispute resolution options when they make important decisions about
how to proceed in resolving commercial disagreements.  Non-violent
dispute resolution options include avoiding conflict, seeking consen-
sual agreement with other participants through negotiation or media-
tion, and adjudicating by using arbitration or litigation to let outsiders
1 See Mark A. Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas:  A Law School Curriculum for
Free Markets and Open Borders, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1998) (stating
that “flourishing economic cohesion assuredly creates tension”); Walter G. Gans,
Saving Time and Money in Cross-Border Commercial Disputes, 52 DISP. RESOL. J.
50, 52 (stating that negotiations and documents creating commercial relationships
are not likely to foresee the multiple possibilities for potential future disagreement
and dispute).  More than half of joint ventures end within five years, and most end
within ten.  Harold I. Abramson, Time to Try Mediation of International Commer-
cial Disputes, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323, 324 (1998).
2 Recent political and economic changes have created a rapid increase in the vol-
ume of commercial disputes in Latin American countries.  Horacio Falcao &
Franciso J. Sanchez, Mediation—An Emerging ADR Mechanism in Latin America,
in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 415, 425 (Nigel Blackaby et al.
eds., 2002). In a survey of 180 in-house lawyers at the largest multinational com-
panies in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and England, thirty-eight per-
cent said the volume of disputes had increased in the last three years. Survey
Reveals Trends in Europe on International Disputes, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 6, 6 (2008).
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decide.3  Although found in most of the world’s cultures and practiced
for centuries, mediation is the least used option in this menu.
While avoidance may be a commonly used dispute resolution
option around the world,4 lawyers and their business clients seldom
select it for handling significant commercial disputes.  Negotiation is
used far more frequently, and it is typically conducted by company rep-
resentatives before involving lawyers or by in-house counsel before
hiring outside attorneys.  Now widely viewed as identical to concilia-
tion,5 mediation offers an enhanced negotiation approach to resolving
commercial disputes.
Mediation enhances negotiation by allowing lawyers and busi-
ness persons to converse with the assistance of non-dispute involved
mediators who encourage constructive communication and interac-
tion.6  Mediators help negotiators frame conversations in ways that
counter selective and partisan perceptions, exploit shared and inde-
3 These three options exist in virtually all cultures. P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND
NEGOTIATIONS:  A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (1970); KARL A. SLAIKEU, WHEN
PUSH COMES TO SHOVE:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MANAGING DISPUTES 16 (1996).
4 See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS:  PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 6 (2d ed. 1996).  Managers around the world do not like
disputes and often flee them by avoiding them and doing nothing. EILEEN CAR-
ROLL & KARL J. MACKIE, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION:  THE ART OF BUSINESS DIPLO-
MACY 4-5 (2d ed. 2006).
5 The core concept of mediation in most Latin American countries, derived from
the United States, views mediation as third-party assisted negotiation.  Falcao &
Sanchez, supra note 2, at 416.  Some Latin American countries use different words
to describe this process and define it differently, often labeling it conciliation. Id.
at 416, 420-21.  The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL) for International Commercial Conciliation defines conciliation as “a pro-
cess, whether referred to by the expression conciliation, mediation, or an
expression of similar import, whereby parties request a third person or persons . . .
to assist them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute
. . . .”  Jernej Sekolec & Michael B. Getty, The UMA and the UNCITRAL Model
Rule:  An Emerging Consensus on Mediation and Conciliation, 2003 J. DISP.
RESOL. 175, 185.
6 Mediation is best understood as assisted and enhanced negotiation. See, e.g.,
DWIGHT GOLANN & JAY FOLBERG, MEDIATION: THE ROLES OF ADVOCATE AND NEU-
TRAL 95 (2006); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND
THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 266 (2005); E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K.
HUBER, MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATION: REACHING AGREEMENT IN LAW AND BUSI-
NESS 281 (2d ed. 2007).  Mediators help solve a primary problem in human commu-
nication, which is the illusion that it occurs when persons talk.  This clarification
and translation is important because people “see the world from their own per-
sonal vantage point, and they frequently confuse their perceptions with reality.
Routinely, they fail to interpret what you say in the way you intend and do not
mean what you understand them to say.” ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WITHOUT GIVING IN 19 (2d ed. 1991).
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pendent interests, and investigate resolutions that promote mutual
gain.7  Unlike judges and arbitrators, mediators do not decide issues or
enter judgments.  Instead, mediators use confidential sessions to gen-
erate more and better information that often helps participants create
agreements that accomplish more than is allowed by the narrow, win-
lose remedies available in adjudication.8  Combating biased percep-
tions and distorted judgments, mediators help participants craft reso-
lutions that allow all disputants to satisfy some of their interests.9
Mediation also allows businesses to control outcomes themselves and
avoid the risks, delays, and additional costs that adjudication brings.10
Despite these and other advantages, adjudication, through either liti-
gation or arbitration, remains the dispute resolution option selected
most often in the United States and Latin America after non-mediated
negotiation fails to resolve commercial disputes.
Lawyers in both the United States and Latin American coun-
tries play important roles in making decisions regarding how their
commercial clients approach resolving disputes.  Lawyers help clients
understand and analyze dispute resolution options, which is usually
an important initial step.11  Because mediation is relatively new to the
legal dispute arena, lawyers often serve as the primary source of infor-
mation for their commercial clients about the existence and benefits of
this option.12  Attorneys’ explanations and recommendations signifi-
cantly influence the dispute resolution method used.13  U.S. lawyers
often rely on their adjudication-influenced habits of perceiving and
acting while recommending and taking primary responsibility for the
7 See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 27 (3d ed.
2004); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 6, at 266-67.
8 MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 6, at 270-71.  Common agreements result-
ing from mediated commercial disputes include future contracts that take account
of past wrongs, offer mutual profits, specify or prohibit specific future conduct, and
include provisions for valued items such as reference letters and apologies. Id.
9 Id. at 270.  They can encourage parties to agree to future contract provisions
that rectify past problems and offer profit for all as opposed to the conventional
money damage remedies adjudication provides. Id.
10 A sample of 606 U.S. Fortune 1000 companies showed that 82.9% thought that
mediation allowed disputants to control their own destinies by resolving disputes
themselves. DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION
OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPO-
RATIONS 17 (2008).
11 CARROLL & MACKIE, supra note 4, at 18.
12 John Lande, Getting the Faith:  Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe
in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 169-71 (2000).
13 Roselle L. Wissler, When Does Familiarity Breed Contempt?  A Study of the Role
of Different Forms of ADR Education and Experience in Attorneys’ ADR Recom-
mendations, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 199, 199 (2002).
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means used to pursue their clients’ commercial dispute resolution
objectives.14
Most U.S. lawyers learn about mediation through experience
or their legal education.15  Research demonstrates that lawyers who
participate in mediation value mediating more than those who have
not experienced it.16  Experience with mediation is the primary reason
U.S. lawyers recommend that their commercial clients use it.17  In
Latin America, personal experiences with mediation or reports by
trusted colleagues provide the most convincing reason to use this dis-
pute resolution option.18
This article surveys current contexts in which commercial me-
diation occurs in the United States and Latin American countries.  Af-
ter summarizing data assessing awareness by commercial actors of
important differences between commercial mediation and adjudica-
tion, it analyzes the relatively infrequent use of mediation despite sig-
nificant knowledge of its potential advantages.  Exploring this
discrepancy and focusing on lawyers, it next examines factors that in-
fluence U.S. and Latin American lawyers when they converse with
commercial clients regarding selecting a dispute resolution.  Analyzing
both similarities arising from universal decision-making biases and
shared legal cultural traditions and differences flowing from common
law and civil legal system influences, this article argues that all of
these factors strongly influence U.S. and Latin American lawyers to-
ward adjudicating.  These factors also explain why mediation is not
used more to resolve commercial disputes.
II. USES AND ADVANTAGES OF COMMERCIAL MEDIATION
Mediating commercial disputes before adjudication may occur
voluntarily after disagreements arise or pursuant to contract provi-
sions that specify use of mediation.19  Contracts specifying mediation
first allow a stepped approach where companies agree to explore busi-
ness-oriented solutions not constrained by legal frameworks initially
14 Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 896 (2008).
15 Lande, supra note 12, at 169-71 (stating that personal experience with media-
tion supplied the major source of information for about two-thirds of the attorneys
and one-third of the executives surveyed).
16 Richard Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, 82 A.B.A. J. 54, 57 (1996).
17 Wissler, supra note 13, at 223.
18 Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 429.
19 See Don Peters, Can We Talk?  Overcoming Barriers to Mediating Private
Transborder Disputes in the Americas, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1251, 1298-1301
(2008).
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and to postpone adjudication until after this effort occurs.20  Research
suggests that agreeing to mediate disputes after they arise seldom
happens.21  Even when one lawyer and commercial client understand
the potential gains disputants can achieve by mediating, their counter-
parts frequently do not share this assessment.22  Although mediating
pursuant to contract agreements occurs more often, it still happens
less frequently than its advantages warrant.23
Commercial disputes that generate litigation also are often re-
ferred or ordered to mediation under court-connected programs that
are common in the United States and many other countries.24  Mediat-
ing legal disputes already in litigation grew rapidly in the United
20 KATHLEEN M. SCANLON, DRAFTER’S DESKBOOK:  DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES
1.5 (2002); Peters, supra note 19, at 1298.  In many ways this stepped approach
parallels the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade Organization
and NAFTA and CAFTA provisions. See Maraja Alejandra Rodriguez Lemmo,
Study of Selected International Dispute Resolution Regimes, with an Analysis of
the Decisions of the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 863, 864-65 (2002).  These provisions recommend beginning with consul-
tations following strict guidelines and if negotiations fail, adjudication (via arbi-
tration) occurs. Id.  Parties can agree to use other processes, like mediation, at
any time. Id.  U.S. courts generally enforce predispute agreements to mediate by
reasoning that these provisions obligate only discussing, not reaching, agreement.
Kathleen M. Scanlon & Adam Spiewak, Enforcement of Contract Clauses Provid-
ing for Mediation, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 1 (2001).
21 See Peters, supra note 19, at 1300.
22 David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control: The Corporate Em-
brace of ADR, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 145 (1998).
23 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Comparative Study of Resolution Procedures in Ger-
many: Summary, http://cpradr.org/Portals/0/summaryCommercialDisputeResolu-
tion.pdf (2005) (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (hereinafter German Dispute
Resolution Procedures) (summarizing a survey of 158 companies in Germany that
found litigation to be the procedure most frequently used and perceived to be the
least beneficial in many respects and recommended wide-spread use of dispute
resolution clauses in contracts); see Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employ-
ing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early
Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 841 (1998) (finding that three
companies who had signed a pledge to mediate before adjudicating did not in-
crease their use of mediation).
24 Penny Brooker & Anthony Lavers, Mediation Outcomes: Lawyer’s Experience
with Commercial and Construction Mediation in the United Kingdom, 5 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L. J. 161, 172 (2005); Deborah Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves:  How
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System,
108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 185-87 (2003).  Professor Hensler estimated that over
half of U.S. state court systems and nearly all of its ninety-four federal district
courts have developed court-mandated or –referred mediation programs.  Hensler,
supra at 185.  The state of Florida, for example, authorizes its courts to order “all
or any portion” of a contested lawsuit to mediation before a trial date is set. FLA.
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States, Australia, Canada, England, and other common law countries
in the 1980s and 1990s.  Civil law countries started adapting and
adopting these approaches later.25  For example, the European Parlia-
ment approved a directive in 2008 that strongly encourages mediating
cross-border commercial disputes.26  Although several Latin American
countries started viewing mediation as a viable option for lawsuits in
the 1990s,27 none, with the exception of Argentina, have adopted broad
court-connected or judge-mandated use of this process.28
The United States is the most litigious country in the world.29
Because U.S. companies file four times as many lawsuits as individu-
als do,30 they are repeat players in the U.S. litigation system. Conse-
quently, executives and managers at most large U.S. companies know
the advantages and disadvantages of resolving commercial disputes by
litigating.
Surveys of U.S. business men and women show significant
awareness of the drawbacks of litigation31 and the potential advan-
tages that mediating has compared to adjudicating commercial dis-
putes.32  Many U.S. executives and managers see mediation as a
better way to find outcomes that connect directly to business interests
STAT. § 44.102 (2009).  This encompasses all commercial lawsuits filed in Florida
courts.
25 See GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION 7-8 (Nadja Alexander ed., 2d ed. 2006) [here-
inafter GLOBAL MEDIATION TRENDS].
26 The Directive Is In: European Union Strongly Backs Cross-Border Mediation, 26
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 119, 119 (2008) [hereinafter EU Backs Cross-
Border Mediation].
27 Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 415.
28 In 1995 Argentina enacted a law mandating mediation before any lawsuit, ex-
cepting family matters, could reach trial.  James M. Cooper, Latin America in the
Twenty-First Century: Access to Justice, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 429, 433 (2000).
From April 1996 through April 1997 in the Commercial Court of Appeals, 69.43%
of 29,986 commercial disputes in litigation that were mediated reached agree-
ment. Id.  Chile requires a form of mandatory mediation (called conciliation) in
consumer protection matters. Sekolec & Getty, supra note 5, at 178.  Columbia,
Ecuador, and Peru also have mediation or conciliation laws.  Cooper, supra at 437;
Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 417.
29 Julia Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens:  How Cultural Values Shape
Our Disputing Processes, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 289, 302 n.88.
30 Craig A. McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing:  Overcoming Barriers to the
Effective Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 Ohio
St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1, 26 (1998); Carmel Sileo & David Ratcliff, Straight Talk
About Torts, TRIAL, July 2006, at 44.
31 Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with
Sticky Defaults:  Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 91-92 (2005).
32 Wissler, supra note 13, at 204.
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because, unlike adjudicating, mediating proceeds without applying
law-based frames regarding legal rights, defenses, and remedies.33  In-
terests reflect the underlying needs and motivations of the disputants,
and they often differ significantly from the frameworks of legal claims
and remedies.34  Most commercial disputes, for example, have multi-
ple variables, and companies commonly have complex interest sets
that interact with these factors in ways that are often individual to
each entity.35
Commercial disputes encompass business, relational, and pro-
cedural factors as well as economic concerns.36  Commonly shared
company interests in commercial disputes include saving time and
money, preserving relationships, and creating satisfactory, durable,
and confidential outcomes.37  Mediation better honors these business
interests by encouraging looking forward to assess future commercial
opportunities rather than emphasizing looking backward to determine
legal consequences arising from past events.38  Companies usually
care more about solving problems quickly to enhance continued busi-
ness opportunities than they value winning debates about law applica-
tions and establishing new legal doctrines or statutory interpretations.
Developing, creating, and maintaining commercial connections
between businesses that are important to long term economic growth
takes time and money.39  U.S. business persons believe that mediation
helps resolve disputes while preserving these important relationships
33 See Gans, supra note 1, at 53; F. Peter Phillips, How Conflict Resolution
Emerged within the Commercial Sector, 25 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 3,
6 (2007).
34 FISHER ET AL., supra note 6, at 40-50; David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, Inter-
ests: The Measure of Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION:  READINGS, EXERCISES, AND
CASES 130-37 (Roy J. Lewicki et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993).
35 Michael L. Moffitt, Disputes as Opportunities to Create Value, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 173, 176 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone
eds., 2005).
36 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGE-
MENT: IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES IN MANAGING BUSI-
NESS CONFLICTS 19 (2006) [hereinafter DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT]
(listing these interests as reasons companies use mediation); LIPSKY & SEEBER,
supra note 10, at 19 (1998) (listing these factors as reasons companies use
mediation).
37 See DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at 19 (examining the
factors that companies list as reasons for using mediation).
38 See Phillips, supra note 33, at 6.
39 See Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 424; Thomas W. Walde, Pro-Active Me-
diation of International Business and Investment Disputes Involving Long-Term
Contracts:  From Zero-Sum Litigation to Efficient Dispute Management, TRANS-
NAT’L DISP. MGMT., May 2004, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-man-
agement.com/samples/welcome.html (follow hyperlink containing article title).
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better than adjudication does.40  Mediation helps participants turn
disputes into deals by renegotiating contracts to resolve specific
problems, which permits resuming strengthened commercial relation-
ships41 and creating velvet divorces that liquidate associations amica-
bly.42  In contrast, adjudication more often ends rather than repairs
commercial relationships.  Adjudication typically assigns blame, pro-
duces win-lose outcomes, terminates relationships contentiously, and
creates disincentives for companies to do future business together.43
U.S. business men and women believe that mediation produces
outcomes in less time than adjudication.44  Eight out of ten executives
and managers surveyed concluded that mediation saves time over liti-
gation.45  U.S. business personnel know that mediating avoids the de-
lays caused by litigation’s pleading and evidence assembling processes
and the collateral and costly skirmishes these procedures often gener-
ate.  Arbitration similarly diverts company time, money, and energy to
ancillary legal battles and procedural quarrels.46  Assuming appropri-
ate company decision-makers who are willing to negotiate attend, me-
diations can resolve complex disputes in days rather than months or
years.47  In Latin America, mediation’s use of  relevant business infor-
40 80% of the business executives acknowledged that mediation helps preserve im-
portant commercial relationships.  Lande, supra note 12, at 186.  59% of business
persons in another study said that mediation preserves business relationships bet-
ter than adjudication. LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 18.  56% said the same
thing in another study. DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at
19.
41 CARROLL & MACKIE, supra note 4, at 12-18.  For example, many intellectual
property disputes begin as rights claims but are resolved as negotiated licensing
arrangements. Id.
42 Id.
43 Julie Barker, International Mediation—A Better Alternative for the Resolution
of Commercial Disputes:  Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an Interna-
tional Commercial Mediation with Mexicans, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L COMP. L.J. 1, 7
(1996); see CARROLL & MACKIE, supra note 4, at 34.
44 Peters, supra note 19, at 1285-86.
45 See DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at 19 (comparing
84% of business people who believe mediation saves time as opposed to litigation);
LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that 80.1% believe mediation saves
time as compared to litigation).
46 George W. Coombe, Jr., The Resolution of Transnational Commercial Disputes:
A Perspective from North America, 5 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 25 (1999);
Peters, supra note 19, at 1259.
47 The London based Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution reports the average
length of its cross border commercial mediations is two days. CARROLL & MACKIE,
supra note 4, at 29.  A Scandinavian supplier and an Asian producer chose a three-
day meditation rather than an arbitration that the disputes privately estimated
would take one to two years to conclude. Id. at 6.
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mation allows it to be “fast,” not “slow” as occurs in commercial
litigation.48
Because time is usually a substantial component of expense,
U.S. business persons believe that mediation is less expensive than
adjudication.  91% conclude that mediation saves money compared to
litigation.49  Surveying sixty-nine U.S. companies, 71% reported cost
savings when comparing mediation to litigation costs.50  Another
study at one large American corporation showed that the costs of using
mediation were one-third less than litigation expenses.51
U.S. business men and women typically rate mediation above
arbitration on all of these business interest measures.  For example,
arbitration’s use of formal, legalistic frames obscures recognition and
exploration of business interest-based outcomes by focusing on back-
ward looking facts, evidence, and arguments needed to assert and de-
fend legal rights.52  U.S. executives believe that mediation preserves
commercial relationships better than arbitration does.53  Although ar-
bitration usually has time and cost advantages over litigation, U.S.
business men and women view mediation as being superior to arbitra-
tion in saving time and resolving commercial disputes more quickly.54
Similarly, U.S. business men and women believe that mediation is less
48 Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 419.  Many Latin American countries suffer
from slow, bureaucratic, and inefficient judicial systems. Id. at 425.
49 DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at 19; see LIPSKY & SEE-
BER, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that 89.2% believe mediation saves money com-
pared to litigation).
50 Catherine Cronin-Harris & Peter H. Kaskell, How ADR Finds a Home in Cor-
porate Law Departments, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 158, 170 (1997).
51 Analyzing Company ADR System Practices, 22 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LI-
TIG. 47, 53 (2004).
52 Eric D. Green, International Commercial Dispute Resolution: Courts, Arbitra-
tion, and Mediation, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 175, 177-78 (1997); Peters, supra note 19,
at 1259.
53 LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 17 (reporting that 58.7% choose mediation
to preserve relationships as compared to 41.3% choosing arbitration for that rea-
son); DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at 19 (noting that 56%
of businesses choose mediation to preserve relationships while 38% choose arbitra-
tion for this reason).
54 LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that compared to litigation,
80.1% of respondents use mediation to save time while 68.5% use arbitration to
save time); DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at 19 (stating
that compared to litigation, 84% of respondents  use mediation to save time, while
73% use arbitration to save time).
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expensive than arbitration.55  They also express more confidence in
mediators than arbitrators.56
U.S. business men and women who have experienced media-
tion of commercial disputes report satisfaction with the process and
the results of their interactions.57 The majority of U.S. executives also
agreed that mediation was appropriate in half or more of their com-
mercial disputes that they were presently litigating.58  Only 16% of
these executives indicated that mediation was appropriate in less than
half of the commercial disputes they were litigating.59
Evidence suggests that civil legal system-based companies con-
cur.  Eighty-four percent of French companies surveyed expressed sat-
isfaction with mediation.60  All twenty-five Italian companies who
responded to another survey thought that their companies could bene-
fit from mediating commercial disputes.61
Despite these favorable attitudes toward and experiences with
commercial mediation, businesses do not mediate disputes very often.
Although some companies successfully use a systemic approach to con-
flict that requires mediating before adjudicating,62 a survey of 600
55 A survey of sixty-nine companies showed that 71% reported cost savings when
comparing mediation to litigation costs, compared to 44% reporting cost savings
comparing arbitration to litigation.  Cronin-Harris & Kaskell, supra note 50, at
170-71. See LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that compared to liti-
gation, 89.2% think mediation saves money while 68.6% think that arbitration
does); DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at  19 (noting that
compared to litigation, 91% of respondents think mediation saves money while
71% think arbitration does).
56 Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 22, at 151.  48% of 606 company lawyers surveyed
expressed a lack of confidence in arbitrators as compared to 29% expressing this
regarding mediators. Id.  Overall, these commercial lawyers were more satisfied
with mediation than with arbitration. Id. at 153-54.
57 See Lande, supra note 12, at 176.  Reviewing sixty-two studies evaluating more
than 100 court-connected mediation programs showed that more than 70% of liti-
gants were satisfied with mediation, and more than 80% thought the process was
fair.  Jennifer Shack, Efficiency:  Mediation in Courts Can Bring Gains, But Under
What Conditions?, 9 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 11 (2003).  Analyzing nine studies compar-
ing satisfaction and fairness perceptions between citizens who participated in me-
diation and those who did not found that six showed higher rates for those who
mediated while three discerned no difference. Id. at 12.
58 Lande, supra note 12, at 172-73.
59 Id. at 173.
60 A New Study Shows How ADR Is Perceived by French Business Executives, 64 J.
DISP. RESOL. 13, 13 (2009) [hereinafter French Executives’ ADR Perceptions].
61 Giuseppe De Palo & Penelope Harley, Mediation in Italy: Exploring the Contra-
dictions, 21 NEGOT. J. 469, 473 (2005).
62 The components of a systematic dispute resolution approach include viewing
disputes as expected, rather than unusual, occurrences, developing system-wide
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U.S. companies showed only 19% mediated frequently.63  Another sur-
vey of 250 companies showed that 16% do not use mediation at all,
25% rarely use it, and 35% use it only occasionally.64
Similar data exists in civil law countries.  One hundred fifty-
eight German companies surveyed showed that mediation was gener-
ally perceived as beneficial, yet rarely used to resolve commercial dis-
putes.65  A survey of seventy French companies showed only 39%
mediate commercial disputes.66  All twenty-five of the Italian compa-
nies surveyed believed mediation is beneficial, yet 40% have never
used it to resolve commercial disputes.67  Consistent with these re-
sults, adjudication  is the most frequently used commercial dispute
resolution process in the United States,68 Europe,69 and Latin
America.70 Litigation is the preferred process for domestic disputes,71
and arbitration is the preferred process for cross border conflicts.72
The primary constraint on broader mediation use is self-in-
flicted because this discrepancy largely results from lawyers’ resis-
tance to using mediation. .73  The unwillingness of dispute
counterparts to consider mediating is a principal reason companies do
not use mediation and was identified as a barrier by three-quarters of
600 U.S. corporations surveyed.74  Although some of this resistance
policies that use mediation before adjudicating to pursue interest-based resolu-
tions, and directing lawyers to follow this approach. See  McEwen, supra note 30,
at 25; Peters, supra note 19, at 1290-91; DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT,
supra note 36, at 22, 26.  Companies that have established this approach are more
likely to resolve commercial disputes quicker and at less cost. Id. at 21.
63 LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 10.
64 DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 36, at 17.
65 German Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 23.
66 French Executives’ ADR Perceptions, supra note 60, at 13.
67 De Palo & Harley, supra note 61, at 473.
68 Gold, supra note 29, at 302 (discussing litigation  as the “default American dis-
pute resolution process”); see LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 10 (explaining
that a small percentage of U.S. companies use mediation frequently); DISPUTE-
WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note  36, at 17 (noting that 76% of U.S. com-
panies use mediation occasionally, rarely, or not at all).
69 De Palo & Harley, supra note 61, at 473; German Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures, supra note 23 (explaining that litigation is the procedure most frequently
used to resolve commercial disputes and is perceived to be least beneficial in most
respects).
70 Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 428-29.
71 Gold, supra note 29, at 302.
72 Peters, supra note 19, at 1261.
73 CARROLL & MACKIE, supra note 4, at 114 (stating that  the greatest constraint
on mediation usage is self-imposed, resulting from the fact that managers and
lawyers often resist entering the process).
74 LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 26.
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undoubtedly results from dictates to adjudicate made by executives
and managers, research disclosed no data regarding how often choices
to adjudicate a commercial dispute are made after a full comparison
with mediation’s advantages and disadvantages.
Considerable evidence suggests that this comparison does not
happen frequently in the United States.  Adjudicating is often the only
dispute resolution alternative identified and analyzed by U.S. law-
yers.75  One survey showed that counsel had not mentioned mediation
as an option in seventy commercial lawsuits proceeding that year.76  A
survey of 2300 Ohio lawyers showed that only 14% regularly recom-
mended mediation to their clients.77  Several studies showed that
large percentages of U.S. lawyers rarely use mediation.78 These
surveys also show that 17% or less reported using mediation often,
usually, or always.79
Minimal use of commercial mediation also occurs in civil law
countries.  Local bar associations in Latin American countries express
skepticism toward mediation.80  Although a close fit between Latin
American culture and mediation exists, mediating has not been an
easy sell in these countries despite its advantages over adjudication.81
Three years after Poland introduced mediation to its Civil Procedure
Code, Polish lawyers continue to demonstrate reluctance to mediate
commercial disputes.82  Legislative activity in Italy has not generated
a substantial commitment to use mediation in the Italian legal com-
munity.83 Sixty-eight percent of Italian companies surveyed reported
that lawyers did not encourage them to consider mediation as an alter-
native to adjudication.84
Commercial disputants report frequent use of adjudication
even when the benefits of using mediation are apparent.85  A detailed
75 Peters, supra note 19, at 1294.
76 CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution Spring Meeting—June 1996, 14 ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 98 (1996).
77 Wissler, supra note 13, at 221 (noting that 59% of counsel said they sometimes
recommended mediation and 27% said they never recommended mediation).
78 Id. at 211 (observing that most attorneys who had used mediation reported us-
ing it in 25% or less of their cases).
79 Id.
80 Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 427.
81 Id. at 428.
82 Don Peters & Ewa Gmurzynska, Yes We Can: Overcoming Barriers to Mediat-
ing Private Commercial Disputes, 7 WARSAW UNIVERSITY L. REV. 122, 126-27
(2008).
83 De Palo & Harley, supra note 61, at 473.
84 How Business Conflict Resolution Is Being Practiced in China and Europe, 23
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 148, 149 (2007).
85 Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 22, at 145.
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analysis of six large U.S. corporations revealed a failure to increase
use of mediation even though business principals supported expanded
use.86  A general counsel for one of these companies said that he could
not think of an initiative he had more difficulty selling than mediating
commercial disputes because lawyers “generally were resistant.”87
This article analyzes this resistance found in both common law
U.S. lawyers and civil law system Latin American lawyers.  This anal-
ysis argues that biases flowing from the way human brains perceive
and make decisions substantially influence this resistance.  It also con-
tends that shared legal cultural factors resulting from similarities in
how law is used to resolve disputes in adjudication and how lawyers
are educated significantly explain this resistance.  This article then ex-
amines factors which combine to reduce the influence that differences
in how common law and civil system lawyers practice might otherwise
have when helping clients decide how to approach resolving commer-
cial disputes.  It concludes by presenting reasons why carefully assess-
ing mediation as a pre-adjudication option helps lawyers counter
perceptual, decision-making, and legal cultural biases while allowing
commercial clients to avoid the risks and substantial transaction costs
inherent in adjudicating disputes.
III. PERCEPTUAL AND DECISION-MAKING BIASES
INFLUENCING BOTH COMMON LAW AND CIVIL
SYSTEM LAWYERS
All decision-making and behavioral activity involved in identi-
fying, explaining, recommending, and implementing commercial dis-
pute resolution options, like all human choice and action, starts with
perception.88  Humans perceive through their sensory receptors of
sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste.89  Meanings derived from these
perceptions influence decisions, predictions, and actions.  Recent scien-
tific research demonstrates that humans form these meanings largely
as the result of emotional reactions, and they may or may not then
subject these responses to conscious, cognitive reflection, review, and
adjustment.90
Contemporary science has demonstrated that human decisions
result from interactions between different brain networks, many of
86 Rogers & McEwen, supra note 23, at 841.
87 Id. at 841-42.
88 Don Peters, Forever Jung:  Psychological Type Theory, The Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator and Learning Negotiation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 13  (1993).
89 Gold, supra note 29, at 293; LARRY A. SAMOVAR & RICHARD E. PORTER, INTER-
CULTURAL COMMUNICATION 10 (9th ed. 2000).
90 Wendell Jones & Scott H. Hughes, Complexity, Conflict Resolution, and How
the Mind Works, 20 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 485, 488-90 (2003).
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which produce emotion.91  Wide agreement now exists that human
brains essentially use two different decision-making methods:  a con-
scious, logical, slow process of thinking through perceptions and alter-
natives and a quicker, emotion-based system that operates largely
below the surface of consciousness.92  Although the conscious cognitive
brain gets virtually all of the attention in decision-making theory and
literature, most of what humans think and do is really driven by their
emotions.93  Many, if not most, human decisions and actions are either
made or strongly influenced by these quick, effortless, emotional brain
reactions.94
Although lawyers believe that their analyses, predictions, and
decisions are rational, substantial evidence suggests that these beliefs
are not accurate.95  Many identifiable emotional and cultural factors
frequently distort rational decision-making.96  Many occur as the re-
sult of how rapid, subconscious emotional brain systems perceive, in-
terpret, and respond to information.  Many others occur as the result
of neural shortcuts used when working with complex decisions such as
those involved in identifying, explaining, and evaluating commercial
dispute resolution methods.97  Humans are more likely to use emo-
tional brain-based perception and neural short cuts when making deci-
sions confronting uncertain situations,98 and commercial disputes, at
least initially, generally generate substantial uncertainty.
Occurring rapidly and largely below conscious awareness, emo-
tion-based decision-making influences are difficult to detect and
counter.99  Although these systems frequently work well, they occa-
sionally misfire for specific, consistent reasons.100 These misfires often
create biased, ineffective, non-optimal decisions and actions.  Many of
these common decision-making biases occur frequently when resolving
91 JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE DECIDE xv (2009).
92 MALCOLM  GLADWELL, BLINK:  THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 10
(2005).
93 LEHRER, supra note 91, at 23; Jones & Hughes, supra note 90, at 490.
94 LEHRER, supra note 91, at 26-27.
95 Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Set-
tlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1999).
96 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:  NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 156 (2000).
97 Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation,
20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683, 690-91 (2005); Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S
FIELDBOOK 351 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
98 LEHRER, supra note 91, at 76.
99 Birke & Fox, supra note 95, at 3-4.
100 GLADWELL, supra note 92, at 15.
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disputes, and several influence choosing resolution options.101  They
often interact and combine to influence decisions to adjudicate rather
than mediate commercial disputes.102
Human decision-making begins with initial perception.  To
manage the overwhelming external stimuli that human brains con-
front, people perceive selectively in potentially biased ways by noticing
and emphasizing some aspects of events and situations while ignoring
others.103  Human perceptual experiences differ.  Everyone selects,
evaluates, and organizes external stimuli in unique ways so persons
often interpret the same event, situation, or context differently.104
Perception is influenced by what humans have learned and exper-
ienced in their environments and their past.105  People construct real-
ity on foundations of what they pay attention to and how they use
their expectations, interests, and experiences to construe meanings.106
Selective perception reflects human tendencies to perceive in
self-serving ways.107  Human brains work hard to tell simple stories
consistent with what they know to protect themselves from ill-fitting
data.108  People typically assume they are objective and reasonable
101 See generally Peters, supra note 19, at 1263-75.
102 Id. at 1273.
103 Sheila Heen & Douglas Stone, Perceptions and Stories, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S
FIELDBOOK, supra note 97, at 343, 343-47.  An ensemble of alerting, orienting, and
executive brain networks collaborate during perception. WINIFRED GALLAGHER,
RAPT ATTENTION AND THE FOCUSED LIFE 8 (2009).  They attune people to what is
going on in their outer and inner worlds, using a basic mechanism that selects
some aspects of perception and suppressing the rest. Id. at 8-9.  Human brains
select a thin slice of what is going on, represent or depict it, store it, and then
make this part of perceivers’ reality. Id.
104 Gold, supra note 29, at 293.  Business persons from different parts of the same
organization often see dispute contexts and situations differently.  Heen & Stone,
supra note 103, at 344 (describing how, in any organization, where you sit influ-
ences what you see).
105 DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY:  THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND
THE PAST 3 (1996); Gold, supra note 29, at 293; Heen & Stone, supra note 103, at
344;.  Brain nerve cells translate incoming sensory information into explicit repre-
sentations that support and are influenced by a person’s previous knowledge of the
world from learning and experience. GALLAGHER, supra note 103, at 20.
106 Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psy-
chologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 437, 451-53, 463 (2009).  People ordinarily perceive things “in syn-
chrony with [their] accumulated knowledge, which enriches and defines” their ex-
periences and ensures their “uniqueness.” GALLAGHER, supra note 103, at 25.
107 Max H. Bazerman & Katie Shonk, The Decision Perspective to Negotiation, in
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 35, at 52, 55; Birke & Fox,
supra note 95, at 14; Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 97, at 354.
108 Heen & Stone, supra note 103, at 346-47.
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when confronting problems.109 Applying false consensus bias, humans
also assume that others looking at the same data would draw the same
conclusions,110 and they often erroneously attribute unreasonable or
harmful motives to others who reach different interpretations.111
When differences arise, humans inaccurately believe that they
have perceived all important data,112 and they attend to information
that justifies their perspectives while ignoring other stimuli.  This se-
lective perceptual process mirrors adjudication.  Adjudication encour-
ages limited information assessment by requiring asserting and
substantiating claims that rely on some, but not all, potentially useful
data present in complex situations.  Adjudication also assumes that
this legally relevant data is all that matters for resolving commercial
disputes.
Selective perception contributes to self-serving, biased attribu-
tion.  Attribution theory analyzes how humans attribute causal mean-
ing to behavior.113  In order to achieve a sense of control in their lives,
people routinely look for causes that explain their behaviors and the
actions of those with whom they interact.114  Determining the causes
of events lets people predict future occurrences.115  People categorize
behavioral causes as internal, resulting from a person’s individual
characteristics, or external or situational, stemming from things
outside the actor’s control.116
Biased attribution stems from human tendencies to attribute
another’s actions to internal characteristics while perceiving that their
109 Keith G. Allred, Relationship Dynamics in Disputes:  Replacing Contention
with Cooperation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 35, at 83-
84.
110 Melissa Janis, Perceptual Errors in Mediation, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 49, 51
(2001).  Humans overestimate the degree to which others share their perspectives.
Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 106, at 464.  False consensus bias describes
human tendencies to assume that their perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, and
lifestyle preferences are the measures of normality and correctness.  Janis, supra
at 51.
111 Allred, supra note 109, at 84.  This is a form of attribution bias discussed later.
See infra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
112 Heen and Stone, supra note 103, at 344.  Called user illusion, humans typically
believe they perceive everything important in situations but in fact brains take in
only small slices of available information, and possibly as little as 1% of a stimulus
field. Id.
113 Russell Korobkin, Psychological Biases that Become Mediation Impediments
Can Be Overcome with Interventions that Minimize Blockages, 24 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 67, 69 (2006).
114 Janis, supra note 110, at 51.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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own behaviors result from external factors.117 Humans tend to prefer
simple causal explanations and are more likely to assign responsibility
to others when they judge behavioral causes to be internal and control-
lable.118  When disputes escalate, biased attribution assumes others’
difficult, problematic, or harmful behavior came from their negative
characteristics.119 Humans easily perceive harmful intent by others
from negative impacts and consequences their actions cause, while si-
multaneously explaining their own similar behaviors as resulting from
contextual factors beyond their control.120  Biased attributions fre-
quently increase disputants’ anger levels beyond what is objectively
justified, encourage them to retaliate, and influence them to adjudi-
cate to punish counterparts.121
Biased human perception, attribution, and decision-making
risks multiply when disputing dynamics transform perception from se-
lective to partisan.122  Partisan, contentious business cultures exist,
and they create disagreements, escalate them into disputes, and erect
barriers to considering mediating before adjudicating.123 Many, if not
most, commercial disputes engender intense emotional and partisan
feelings in the people involved.124  Disputes generate strong emotions
reflecting anger, distrust, and interests in self-preservation that influ-
ence dispute resolution process selection.125  Powerful feelings of sus-
picion, betrayal, and disrespect often influence desires for achieving
vindication, using professional advocates, and punishing dispute coun-
117 Korobkin, supra note 113, at 70.
118 Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 106, at 461.
119 DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS:  HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT
MATTERS MOST 48.
120 Id. at 46-48.  The negative causal attributions often generate judgments of re-
sponsibility and blame.  Sternlight & Robennolt, supra note 106, at 461-62.
121 Korobkin, supra note 113, at 70.
122 ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI:  TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CON-
FLICT 21-31 (1994).
123 McEwen, supra note 30, at 9-10.  “Tough guy” cultures and “macho manage-
ment” influence adversarial position-taking that generate as well as exacerbate
disputes. CARROLL & MACKIE, supra note 4, at 115; McEwen, supra at 10.
124 Commercial litigation is often driven by emotional, not economic, factors.
Symposium, ADR 2000, CPR’s Online Seminar Inside the Law Firm:  Dealing with
Financial Disincentives to ADR, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 43, 45
(1999) [hereinafter Financial Disincentives to ADR].
125 See Peters, supra note 19, at 1275-76.  Demonstrating the reality that commer-
cial disputes are usually personal conflicts in disguise, commercial lawyers fre-
quently confront managers and executives who think they have been wronged and
consequently dig in their heels. McEwen, supra note 30, at 10.  In addition, em-
ployees who have made decisions generating disputes want management support
and feel undermined if mediation threatens outcomes that do not fully vindicate
their actions. LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 24.
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terparts.  All of these emotions influence choosing to adjudicate com-
mercial disputes to achieve vindication by winning and inflicting
harm.
Partisan emotions slow perceptions, mask subtleties, discount
specifics, and produce crude, less complex decisions.126  They often
generate feelings of threat, risk, and danger that stimulate powerful
yet primitive emotional brain-based fight or flight responses.127  This
powerful Paleolithic instinct generates preferences for legalized fight-
ing by adjudicating.128
Partisan perception hardens commitments to beliefs and fur-
ther narrows information gathering.  It reinforces tendencies to seek
only information supporting existing views, to ignore or discount dis-
confirming data, and to resist changing perspectives when confronted
by discrepancies.129  In extreme forms, partisan perception reactively
devalues what disputing counterparts say and do.130  These narrowing
effects of partisan emotions actively discourage seeking to learn or re-
member the perspectives and interests of others,131 encourage either-
or adjudicatory thinking, and hinder both-and approaches that media-
tion encourages.132
Sharing a professional tradition of intense commitment to their
client’s cause, U.S. common  law and Latin American civil system law-
yers risk reinforcing partisan emotions when discussing commercial
dispute resolution options with angry, distrustful, and threatened cli-
126 See Heen & Stone, supra note 103, at 345.
127 See Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, In Our Bones (Or Brains):  Behav-
ioral Biology, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK, supra note 97, at 283, 284-85 (stat-
ing that competitive behavior is understandable from a biological perspective
because it enhances chances of survivability in a prehistoric world of scarce re-
sources).  Human behavior at its most fundamental level is about the brain’s re-
ceiving stimuli, making computations based thereon, and directing actions. Id.
128 CARROLL & MACKIE, supra note 4, at 4-5 (noting that managers around the
world do not like conflicts and often experience fight-or-flight reactions, and
choose to worsen situations by legalized fighting, or adjudication, or to flee
problems by ignoring them and doing nothing).
129 Barendrect & de Vries, supra note 31, at 98; FISHER ET AL., supra note 6, at 22.
130 DEEPAK MALHOTRA & MAX H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS:  HOW TO OVER-
COME OBSTACLES AND ACHIEVE BRILLIANT RESULTS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE AND
BEYOND 110-11 (2007).
131 Barendrect & de Vries, supra note 31, at 98; see FISHER ET AL., supra note 6 at
22-28; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution:  A Cognitive Per-
spective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 47 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds.,
1995).
132 See STONE ET AL., supra note 119, at 39-40 (recommending the acceptance of
different perceptions, working to understand them, and once mutual understand-
ing is achieved, finding effective ways to manage disagreements and solve
problems).
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ents.133  Sometimes U.S. lawyers intentionally stoke their clients’ emo-
tional fires to encourage adjudicatory choice.134 More often, lawyers
remain neutral initially but personally experience partisan perception
after adjudication is selected and produces quarrels and skirmishes.
These preliminary adjudicatory battles often influence U.S. lawyers to
transfer partisan adjudicatory thinking and acting to mediating in
ways that substantially interfere with exploring business interests
and non-legal solutions.135
Incomplete and distorted selective and partisan perception
breeds additional biases resulting from egocentrism-based optimistic
overconfidence.136  Overconfidence leads humans “to discount small
probabilities, assume luck runs in [their] favor, and distort unattrac-
tive consequences.”137  These egocentric tendencies also encourage
humans to bias predictions in self-serving ways that reflect preexisting
beliefs.138
Professionals in many occupations tend to make unrealistically
overconfident or optimistic forecasts regarding future outcomes.139
This frequently happens when professionals estimate outcome
probabilities that depend upon a series of events.140  Adjudication fre-
quently requires prevailing on multiple legal issues and factual ques-
133 Cf. DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE:  THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN RE-
LATIONSHIPS 14-16 (2006) (suggesting that the field of social neuroscience reveals
that all human interactions have emotional subtexts that are contagious and often
transfer automatically from one to the other); Daniel L. Shapiro, Untapped Power:
Emotions in Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK, supra note 97, at 263,
265 (arguing that humans are in a state of perpetual emotion and constantly expe-
rience affective states).
134 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 96, at 167.
135 Peters, supra note 19, at 1270; Business Mediation, From All Points of View: A
Neutral, an Advocate, and an In-House Client on Preparing for ADR, 24 ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 101, 101 (2006).
136 Barendrect & de Vries, supra note 31, at 98.  Humans typically underestimate
time needed to complete tasks, overestimate how much they will enjoy jobs and
vacations, and predict that their marriages will not end in divorce.  Sternlight &
Robbennolt, supra note 106, at 468-71.
137 Donald R. Philbin, Jr., The One Minute Manager Prepares for Mediation: A
Multidisciplinary Approach to Negotiation Preparation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.,
249, 282 (2008).
138 Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 107, at 55; Birke & Fox, supra note 95, at 14;
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 97, at 354.
139 Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 107, at 57; Birke & Fox, supra note 95, at 18.
“[F]or example, [expert] financial analysts tend to overestimate earnings.”  Ster-
nlight & Robbennolt, supra note 106, at 469-70.
140 Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation:  Using Ec-
onomics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 307 n.133 (1999).
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tions.141  Consequently, many biased predictions by lawyers involve
overconfidently forecasting adjudication outcomes.
Predicting future adjudication outcomes substantially influ-
ences commercial dispute method choice and biased overconfident, un-
realistic forecasts commonly occur.  U.S. lawyers routinely
demonstrate optimistic overconfidence.142  U.S. lawyers in one study
rated themselves in the 80th percentage or higher of all lawyers on
their abilities to predict litigation outcomes.143 Biased, inaccurate fu-
ture outcome predictions often influence lawyers to recommend adjudi-
cation, and their clients frequently follow this advice based primarily
on these forecasts.144  Commitments to adjudicate often harden when
commercial clients independently reach equally optimistically overcon-
fident predictions that amplify and reinforce their lawyers’ biased
forecasts.145
The narrowed perception influenced by selective perception,
which can then be combined with and intensified by partisan emo-
tions, creates assumptions that what disputants value in disputes is
limited and diametrically opposed.146  Called fixed pie and zero sum
biases, these assumptions reflect human tendencies to assume that
persons always want only the same things, and that they value these
dispute elements identically.  Applying these beliefs means that one
disputant’s gain is inevitably another participant’s loss.147  Law’s ten-
dency in both common and civil law traditions to measure rights and
141 If a litigant must prevail on four contested points to win a case, such as two
legal issues and two factual questions, and the likelihood of winning on each is
50%, this party’s overall chance of winning is only 12.5%. Id; cf. AMOS TVERSKY &
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11,
14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining the judgmental heuristics of
“availability” and “adjustment and anchoring”).
142 Richard Birke, Settlement Psychology:  When Decision-Making Processes Fail,
18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 212, 214 (2000).
143 Id. One experiment showed that dividing subjects into plaintiff and defendant
groups and presenting them with identical evidence produced a median plaintiff
estimate of success at 75% while a median defense estimate was 55%. HOWARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 75 (1982).
144 Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 31, at 99; Birke & Fox, supra note 95, at
15-18; Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 107, at 57.
145 Sternlight, supra note 140, at 327.  Psychologists have noticed a “groupthink”
dynamic that occurs and heightens commitment to biased decisions. Id.; see also
Gary Mendelsohn, Lawyers as Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 139, 146-48
(1996).
146 MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 130, at 108-12; Bazerman & Shonk, supra
note 107, at 54; Birke & Fox, supra note  95, at 30
147 Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution
and How to Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 213,
216-17 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000).
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remedies in monetary terms reinforces these assumptions.  These bi-
ased assumptions influence U.S. common law and Latin civil law at-
torneys to recommend adjudication because it conflates all commercial
interests into either-or claims where winners get everything while
losers receive nothing.
Distorted selective and partisan perception, fixed pie and zero
sum biases, and optimistic overconfidence often combine to activate a
powerful, emotion-based mental habit: loss aversion.148  Loss aversion
motivates humans to escape anything that feels like loss.  People are
more motivated to avoid losses than to achieve gains.149  This powerful
mental habit often shapes human decisions150 by influencing choices
and actions that attribute more weight to avoiding loss than achieving
gain.151 Loss aversion is an innate emotional flaw in human brains,
and everyone who experiences emotion is vulnerable to its affects.152
Humans assess losses or gains in relation to anchoring refer-
ence points that they assume are neutral.153  Adjudication outcome
predictions provide the anchoring references usually used in choosing
dispute resolution options for commercial disputes.  Anchoring and
framing choices this way requires comparing optimistically overconfi-
dent adjudication forecasts of winning against uncertain mediation
outcomes which frequently require reframing or retreating from these
biased litigation or arbitration predictions.  This comparison explains
why lawyers fear that mediating lessens chances to maximize gain.154
It explains why attorneys often associate mediation with making con-
cessions.155 It also explains why many lawyers believe mediating is a
“euphemism for taking less money.”156
148 LEHRER, supra note 91, at 77.
149 MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 130, at 160.  People will work harder to
avoid losing money than they will to gain the same amount. GALLAGHER, supra
note 103, at 32.
150 Id.
151 Id.; MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 96, at 161.
152 LEHRER, supra note 91, at 81.
153 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 96, at 161; see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 456
(1981).
154 MOORE, supra note 4, at 82; Don Peters, To Sue Is Human: To Settle Divine:
Intercultural Collaborations to Expand the Use of Mediation in Costa Rica, 17 FLA.
J. INT’L L. 9, 11 (2005).
155 LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 10, at 26; cf. Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note
31, at 83 (stating that ADR seeks to find the best way to resolve a dispute).
156 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: Proceedings [from the] CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution Winter Meeting January 1997, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG.
59, 62 (1997).
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All of these predictable emotional brain-based responses and
inaccurate mental shortcuts are commonly experienced by U.S. and
Latin American lawyers when discussing dispute resolution methods
with their commercial clients.  They frequently interact and combine
to produce a powerful and pervasive win-lose mindset.157  Based on
these assumptions, this mindset produces actions that frame all dis-
pute resolution activities as exclusively or primarily requiring gain-
maximizing actions.
Investigations of how professionals develop competence sug-
gest that the most frequent actions displayed by lawyers, business
men and women, public administrators, and industrial mangers flow
from this mindset and demonstrate striving to win and seeking not to
lose.158  Economic theories and business models that advance winning
and avoiding losing as primary, often exclusive, objectives reinforce
this mindset.159  So do general cultural practices such as organiza-
tional promotion systems and athletic activities.160
This win-lose mindset produces substantial resistance to using
mediation.161  U.S. lawyers usually approach dispute resolution with
this win-lose mindset,162 use it during resulting interactions,163  and
resist disconfirming information.164  Surveys show pervasive use of
157 MNOOKIN, ET AL., supra note 96, at 168.  “A mindset is a way of making sense of
the world” based on “relevant knowledge and belief structures[,] . . . congruent
ways of thinking,” and “specific situational cues.”  Barbara O’Brien & Daphna
Oyserman, It’s Not Just What You Think, But Also How You Think About It:  The
Effect of Situationally Primed Mindsets on Legal Judgments and Decision Making,
92 MARQUETTE L. REV. 149, 151 (2008); see notes 175-81 infra and accompanying
text.
158 CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHON, THEORY IN PRACTICE:  INCREASING PROFES-
SIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 63-84 (1974); DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLEC-
TIVE PRACTITIONER:  TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE
PROFESSIONS 256-59 (1987); Lee Bolman, Learning and Lawyering:  An Approach
to Education for Legal Practice, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIENTIAL SOCIAL PROCESSES
111, 119-20 (Cary L. Cooper & Clayton P. Alderfer eds., 1978).
159 ALFIE KOHN, NO CONTEST:  THE CASE AGAINST COMPETITION 70 (1986).
160 Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 107, at 54.
161 Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALBANY L.
REV. 847, 861 (1996); Marguerite Millhauser, ADR as a Process of Change, 6 AL-
TERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 190, 190 (1988).
162 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:  The
Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 755-756 (1984); Don Peters,
Mapping, Modeling, and Critiquing:  Facilitating Learning Negotiation, Media-
tion, Interviewing, and Counseling, 48 FLA. L. REV. 875, 914 (1996).
163 Birke & Fox, supra note 95, at 30-31; Leigh Thompson & Terri DeHarpport,
Social Judgment, Feedback, and Interpersonal Learning in Negotiation, 58 ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 327 (1994).
164 Birke & Fox, supra note 95, at 31.
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win-lose mindset assumptions and actions by U.S. lawyers negotiating
and settling disputes.165
Any one of these biased emotion brain-based perceptual
processes and decision-making short cuts is sufficient to influence U.S.
and Latin American lawyers to recommend adjudication to resolve
commercial disputes that cannot be resolved by non-mediated negotia-
tion.  These processes and short cuts interact and combine, however, to
produce a powerful cumulative influence toward adjudication and
away from mediation.  Consequently, most U.S. lawyers and probably
many Latin American attorneys perceive adjudication as the fallback
option to use if non-mediated negotiations fail without awareness that
this view sacrifices the possible advantages of mediating.166
IV. LEGAL CULTURAL INFLUENCES
In addition to universal, hard-wired emotional-brain and neu-
ral shortcut-based biases, culture — defined as shared beliefs, values,
expectations, and behavioral norms within groups and professions167
— also influences perception. Humans store perceptions in the form of
beliefs and values, which work in combination to form “cultural pat-
terns.”168  Such learned beliefs guide cognitive brain activity and influ-
165 DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION:  THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 29 n.6
(1989) (stating that 24% of lawyers surveyed used a competitive approach during
negotiations).  67% of 2000 Arizona and Colorado lawyers surveyed indicated that
they primarily sought to maximize gain when negotiating. GERALD W. WILLIAMS,
LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 15-40 (1983).  A study of 515 New Jersey
lawyers and fifty-five judges showed that 71% of the cases in which they partici-
pated were resolved in win-lose based negotiating.  Milton Heumann & Jonathan
M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New
Jersey: “You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.,
253, 255 (1997).
166 Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 31, at 111.
167 Peters, supra note 19, at 1275; Gold, supra note 29, at 292-93. Significant civil
legal system differences exist which make common law understandings of the
term “legal profession” problematic.  Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil World,
in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:  THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 1, 4-5 (Richard L. Abel & Philip
S.C. Lewis eds., 1988).  Although lawyers in private practice comprise the core of a
common law county’s legal profession, other categories of law graduates in civil
law countries, such as the magistracy and civil servants, typically predominate
numerically and historically. Id. at 4.  Civil law systems also typically include as
legal occupations groups not counted in common law legal professions, including
notaries everywhere, police chiefs in Brazil and Norway, and process servers in
France. Id. at 4-5.  For comparative purposes, this essay analyzes only those
members of civil law legal systems who engage in private practice, using an inac-
curate assumption that they constitute the legal profession in these countries.
168 Gold, supra note 29, at 293.
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ence decision-making.169  Beliefs also provide a foundation for values,
which in turn supply learned but largely unconscious rules for deter-
mining which actions are appropriate.170
Professions possess an abstract knowledge base, in addition to
shared norms and educational experiences that derive from and rein-
force their core knowledge.171  Even though their traditions regarding
law’s source and development differ,172 U.S. and Latin American legal
professions share norms and educational experiences linked to law, le-
gal doctrines, and procedural rules.  While no U.S. or Latin American
lawyer behaves in precisely the same ways,173 most share tendencies
that are revealed in their actions174 and that encourage adjudication of
commercial disputes more often than mediation.
A. Influences from Legal Cultural Similarities
U.S. common law and Latin civil system lawyers share a pro-
fessional legal culture that strongly emphasizes a rights and remedies
framework for resolving disputes peacefully through adjudication.
This framework generates tendencies in U.S. lawyers to assume that
disputes should be resolved by applying legal rules to fact situations
embedded in disputes.175
169 Id. at 293-94.
170 Id. at  294.
171 Nancy A. Welsh, Looking Down the Road Less Traveled: Challenges to Per-
suading the Legal Profession to Define Problems More Humanistically, 2008 J.
DISP. RESOL. 45, 51.
172 See Philip M. Genty, Overcoming Cultural Blindness in International Clinical
Collaboration:  The Divide Between Civil and Common Law Cultures and Its Im-
plications for Clinical Legal Education, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 131, 136 (2008).  The
civil law tradition arises from the articulation of rules by an absolute monarch,
while the common law tradition stems from constraint of a monarch’s powers. See
id. at 137.  This may encourage lawyers trained in the civil law tradition to seek
authorization before acting while common law attorneys may tend to take initia-
tives unless legal rules prohibit them.
173 For example, some U.S. lawyers have been instrumental in starting and devel-
oping mediation-friendly approaches to law practice. These approaches include
therapeutic jurisprudence, which encourages laws and practices that have benefi-
cial effects, and collaborative law, which encourages lawyers to agree to represent
clients only in negotiations and mediations in an effort to avoid the harmful effects
of litigation.  Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer:  On the Potential Con-
tributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients,
7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2002).
174 Gold, supra note 29, at 295; Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer’s Philosophical Map
and the Disputant’s Perceptual Map:  Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and
Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145, 164 (2001).
175 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 155; Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43
OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-44 (1982).  Trials have defined what it means to be a lawyer in
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Latin American lawyers share this assumption. A commercial
representative discussing mediation in Latin America noted that his
company’s main problem is lawyers,176  explaining that “attorneys
don’t think the way [other] people think.”177 A survey of Venezuelan
lawyers revealed a  preference for adjudication to resolve commercial
disputes.178  An examination of Chilean lawyers’ job descriptions cited
advocating or defending legal positions before courts or administrative
bodies as their most important role.179
Civil lawyers view themselves primarily as advocates in adju-
dication.180  Their  propensity toward defining their adjudicatory role
within an advocacy context has hindered their role as counselors and
allowed competitive legal occupations to perform much of this
activity.181
This shared legal cultural tradition influences selective percep-
tion by U.S. and Latin American lawyers.  Lawyers practicing in both
systems tend to perceive through law-based, rights-oriented lenses.182
U.S. lawyers are more likely than the general population to gather in-
formation using general standards and rules.183 Knowledge of applica-
ble law and  facts potentially relevant to it powerfully influences
lawyers when gathering and giving information during client conver-
sations.184  Lawyers anchor their analyses in the perception of  poten-
tial adjudicatory application of legal doctrines, standards, and
legal culture and popular imagination for centuries.  Robert Rubinson, Client
Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 10
CLINICAL L. REV. 833, 834 (2004).
176 F. Peter Phillips, Exploratory Meeting on Commercial Mediation in Latin
America, May 11, 2010, http://www.cpradr.org/PracticeAreas/CPRinLatinAmerica/
tabid/244/Default.aspx.
177 Id.
178 Manuel Gomez, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Venezuela, NEWS FROM
GOULD (Martin Daniel Gould Center for Conflict Resolution Programs, Stanford
Law School), Spring 2004, at 5.
179 Richard J. Wilson, Three Law School Clinics in Chile, 1970-2000: Innovation,
Resistance and Conformity in the Global South, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 515, 575
(2002).
180 Abel, supra note 167, at 23.
181 Id. at 27.
182 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 160.  These learned basic knowledge structures, or
schemas, define expectations about how to practice law, interview clients, and re-
solve commercial disputes. See Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 106, at 451-
52.  They also focus information-gathering and facilitate lawyers’ abilities to form
legal inferences and assess cases quickly. Id.
183 Welsh, supra note 171, at 50.
184 See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS:  A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 145, 145-46, 148  (1991) (describing how lawyers should use potentially
applicable law to guide information-gathering during interviews).
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rules.185  Latin American lawyers routinely display similar selective
perceptual tendencies.  A Chilean scholar stated that the most impor-
tant law practice habits, skills, and abilities for Chilean lawyers in-
clude identifying relevant facts in situations and linking them to
appropriate legal sources.186
Basing perception on law and legal rules helps U.S. and Latin
American lawyers translate complex, multi-factor situations into man-
ageable frames for adjudicatory resolution.187 While valuable, this
perceptual process is selective because it naturally decreases complex-
ity.188 Using this selective perception to assess commercial disputes
and options for resolving them, lawyers identify legally-authorized
causes of action, legal and factual elements which substantiate or re-
fute these causes of action, key proof issues, important witnesses, es-
sential documents, and monetary damage items.189  Selective
perception usually excludes business interest factors, relational issues,
and non-monetary considerations.190  It also typically ignores reorient-
ing parties to each other, satisfying emotional interests, and promot-
ing respect, affinity, and autonomy.191
Other legal cultural traditions favor adjudication over media-
tion.  For example, U.S. and Latin American lawyers share legal cul-
tural influences that emphasize traditional, conservative options and
do not easily embrace change.192 These tendencies may clash with me-
diation, which is relatively new in commercial dispute and litigation
contexts.193  A human tendency to rely on familiar, traditional ap-
proaches is a “status quo” bias,194  heightened by legal culture in both
common law and civil legal systems.
185 Welsh, supra note 171, at 51.
186 Wilson, supra note 179, at 575-76.
187 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 158.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 174-75.
190 See Riskin, supra note 173, at 16.
191 See Guthrie, supra note 174, at 164, 175.
192 See id. at 178 (arguing that lawyers are viewed by themselves and by others as
“conservative [and] risk averse,” as well as wedded to a legalistic range of dispute-
resolving strategies).
193 Florida lawyers did not embrace mediation easily, but now advise their clients
to use it readily as a result of courts frequently ordering it on  their non-criminal
dockets in 1987.  Peters, supra note 154, at 12.  Lawyers also are not as likely as
other professions to engage in “divergent” thinking “during which a variety of po-
tential solutions are generated before any are critically evaluated.”  Guthrie, supra
note 174, at 178.
194 Peters, supra note 19, at 1271; see Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in
Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1585 (1998).
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Despite the advantages of mediation over adjudication in many
commercial dispute situations, Latin American lawyers  often resist
new approaches or upheaval of traditional methods.195  Fearing sur-
prises, many prefer familiar approaches to new ones.196  To this end,
reliance on the importance of external authority figures, such as
judges or arbitrators, constitutes a significant aspect of civilian legal
culture.197
Both common and civil law systems have established formal
adjudication approaches and created rules to structure dispute resolu-
tion within them in order to promote orderly societies.198  These or-
derly structures and formal rules attract U.S. and Latin American
lawyers to adjudicating commercial disputes.199 Although lawyers
play different roles in common law and civil adjudicatory systems, the
methods for obtaining third-party decisions are generally clear and
linear in both. Legislation and judicial rules provide clear, linear, and
structured frameworks lawyers desire.200
Mediation, however, offers a variable, non-linear process aimed
at facilitating layered negotiation between lawyers and commercial cli-
ents.  Mediation typically follows no legislatively- or judicially-pro-
scribed procedures;201  instead, it uses informal norms to avoid rigid
structural rules, anticipate ambiguities, tolerate differences, and en-
courage non-linear outcomes.202  As a result, mediation is structurally
flexible and differs significantly from the order- and rule-seeking for-
malities usually present in U.S. and Latin American judicial sys-
tems.203 This approach often clashes with the order- and rule-seeking
legal cultural influences U.S. and Latin American lawyers
encounter.204
195 Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 428-29.
196 Id. at 429.
197 See Genty, supra note 172, at 149.
198 Scott Dodson, The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure Civil Litigation in
Comparative Context, 60 ALA. L. REV. 133, 150 (2008) (stating that all nations
create procedural systems seeking “fair, orderly, expedient, cost-effective” admin-
istration of litigation).
199 Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 22, at 145-46.  The lack of clear legal rules was
listed by 28% of 606 respondents as a barrier to the use of commercial mediation.
Id. at 136, 149.  A general counsel for a U.S. public utility described this influence,
stating that  “[c]ost isn’t the issue—it’s the lack of rules.  Litigation may be expen-
sive, but it does have rules.” Id. at 146.
200 See Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 419.
201 Id.
202 Gold, supra note 29, at 314; Millhauser, supra note 159, at 190.
203 Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 419.
204 See Millhauser, supra note 159, at 190 (arguing that mediation’s flexibility and
minimal structure can be a “nightmare” for those who are more rule-bound).
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U.S. and Latin American lawyers also share legal education ex-
periences that emphasize adjudication  over the development of inter-
est-based methods, such as negotiation and problem-solving.  Despite
different approaches to developing and learning law and legal rules,205
both systems primarily, and sometimes exclusively, require that doc-
trines, principles, and rules be learned.  In the United States, most of
this learning occurs in adjudicatory contexts involving interactive
classroom discussions deconstructing written opinions of appellate
courts.206  Latin American civil law educational systems often confront
large class enrollments and, consequently, usually employ lecture-
based instruction  focused on code provisions and authorized academic
commentaries.207 Both systems generally require completion of
courses on how judicial adjudication functions.  This collective empha-
sis communicates explicit and implicit messages that adjudication, due
to its application of code or common law legal principles, is best suited
to resolve commercial disputes.
Although no comparable data was found regarding Latin
American attorneys, U.S. attorneys  have personality tendencies
which encourage an abstract, impersonal, analytical approach to per-
sons and problems that is extensively reinforced by their legal educa-
tion .208  Ninety percent of U.S. lawyers are left brain dominant,
indicating an analytical inclination.209  In fact, researchers often use
lawyers when they seek to measure an occupational group that is ana-
205 Genty, supra note 172, at 136; see Wilson, supra note 179, at 570.
206 See ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION:  A VISION AND
A ROAD MAP 132, 141 (2007) (arguing that American legal education should reduce
its often near-exclusive reliance on the case and Socratic method); WILLIAM M.
SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:  PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW
76 (2007) (reviewing data suggesting that case-dialogue teaching is “not seen by
recent law graduates as particularly helpful in enabling them to move from school
to professional practice”).
207 Genty, supra note 172, at 139-40, 141 (noting that interactive methods are
often used in newer, private universities which have smaller class sizes); Monica
Pinto, Developments in Latin American Legal Education, 21 PENN. ST. INT’L L.
REV. 61, 61-62 (2002) (stating that Latin American law schools usually follow the
European model of large lecture-based classes).
208 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 156.
209 Id.  One U.S. lawyer-mediator described legal education “as a process in which
the left brain circles around the right brain and then eats it.” David A. Hoffman,
Paradoxes of Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 23.  Up to a point, there
is some truth to the popular generalization that a human brain features an analyt-
ical, verbal left hemisphere and an intuitive, creative right hemisphere. GAL-
LAGHER, supra note 103, at 71.  Recent neuroscience research, however, suggests
that difficult tasks require involvement of both hemispheres and distinctions must
be drawn within hemispheres as to where activities relating to particular func-
tions occur. Id.
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lytical in its preferred modes of perceiving, deciding, and acting.210 Re-
search using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, an assessment
instrument that measures preferences for exercising aspects of percep-
tion and judgment, and other studies show that U.S. lawyers are far
more likely than the general population to make decisions analytically,
objectively, and impersonally.211These tendencies further reinforce the
win-lose biases and inclinations to recommend adjudication as the log-
ical way to win disputes.212
The U.S. and Latin American legal education systems offer few
opportunities to learn skills and values beyond the analytical tasks
involved in applying code and other legal principles. U.S. law schools
devote nine percent of total instructional time to instruction and prac-
tice opportunities in interest-based negotiating, mediation practice
and advocacy, interviewing, counseling, and clinics where students
serve actual clients with real problems.213  Ninety-one percent is de-
voted to learning law, adjudicatory procedures, and rule-based advo-
cacy skills.  U.S. law schools offer many elective courses teaching
adjudication, primarily litigation skills and values,214  and  a majority
of U.S. law students take such courses.215  This instruction, along with
the extensive interactive coverage of appellate opinions in most of the
remaining curriculum, ensures that U.S. law students receive ample
education in how to argue, persuade, and apply legal rules in adjudica-
tory situations.216
Although virtually all U.S. law schools now offer at least one
course teaching interest-based negotiation or mediation or both,217
these elective courses limit enrollment to permit valuable perform-
ance-based learning approaches.  Resistant to fundamental change,218
U.S. law schools generally do not provide adequate opportunities for
210 Id.
211 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 157; see Larry Richard, The Lawyer Types, 79
A.B.A. J. 74, 74, 76 (1993).
212 See Peters, supra note 88, at 52.
213 Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:  Narrowing the
Gap, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 239-41 (1992)
[hereinafter MacCrate Report].
214 Id. at 257-58.
215 Id. at 240 (supporting that an estimated 58% of U.S. law students enroll in
litigation skills courses).
216 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion:  New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Respon-
sibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 427 (1997).
217 Welsh, supra note 171, at 49.
218 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 184.
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their students to learn and practice non-adjudicative skills.219  Despite
recent, prominent examinations of U.S. legal education that recom-
mended more curricular attention to these tasks,220 on average, sev-
enty-three percent of U.S. law students receive no learning
opportunities in courses emphasizing the skills and values needed to
negotiate or represent clients in mediation effectively.221
Even though repeated studies show that professional success
in law practice correlates more with relationship skills than it does
with substantive legal knowledge,222 U.S. law students receive little or
no instruction in identifying and responding to human emotions effec-
tively, essential tasks in negotiating,223 mediating,224 interviewing,
and helping clients make difficult decisions.  Studies show that U.S.
lawyers and law students have relatively underdeveloped emotional
219 Finding an imbalance in U.S. legal education concerning instruction in skills
needed to practice in law offices as well as before and in litigation, the MacCrate
Report recommended that law schools develop or expand learning opportunities in
these areas.  MacCrate Report, supra note 213, at 332.  A more recent review of
U.S. legal education recommends that U.S. law schools should strive to develop
competent abilities to resolve legal problems effectively and responsibly, and that
this includes attending and responding to emotions skillfully. STUCKEY ET AL.,
supra note 206, at 60-61.
220 The MacCrate Report specifically highlighted needs for more educational at-
tention to problem-solving, communication, counseling, and negotiation.  Mac-
Crate Report, supra note 213, at 330, 332.  The Carnegie Report criticizes U.S.
legal education for assigning practical legal skills involved in dealing clients to “a
subordinate place” and specifically encourages more broadly teaching negotiation
skills. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 206, at 7.
221 Joseph B. Stulberg et al., Creating and Certifying the Professional Mediator—
Education and Credentialing, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 75, 78 (2004).  This percent-
age may be declining as the number of negotiation and mediation courses contin-
ues to grow.  As of February, 2010, 223 negotiation, mediation, interviewing, and
counseling courses were listed in the latest survey of more than 200 ABA accred-
ited law schools. See ABA Directory, University of Oregon website, available at
http://adr.uoregon.edu/aba/search.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).  In addition,
fifty ADR survey courses and forty mediation clinics were listed. Id. Surprisingly,
early research suggests that having taken a negotiation or mediation course in law
school is not a statistically significant factor predicting a lawyer’s inclination to
advise their clients to use mediation to resolve disputes. See Wissler, supra note
13, at 224.
222 Welsh, supra note 171, at 56.
223 See generally ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMO-
TIONS AS YOU NEGOTIATE (2005) (arguing that human emotions are always present
during negotiations and describing how positive feelings enhance interest-based
negotiating and negative emotions impede it).
224 Welsh, supra note 171, at 53 (arguing that lawyers are unlikely to deal with
clients and counterparts whose emotions need to be heard, understood, acknowl-
edged, and explored).
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and interpersonal capacities and “demonstrate a low interest in emo-
tions and others’ feelings.”225  U.S. lawyers and law students need
training and practice in how to listen, empathize, and navigate
through strong emotional moments effectively because they are un-
likely to bring these skills to their educational and practicing
experiences.226
Most Latin American law schools devote an even smaller per-
centage of their educational resources in this direction.  Extensive reli-
ance on top-down, non-interactive lecture approaches creates beliefs
that experiential learning through role playing, simulations, and su-
pervised actual practice are not important or serious components of
legal education.227  In part because Latin American countries usually
offer law as a first degree, ensure their curriculums provide general
liberal arts backgrounds initially, and do not emphasize preparing stu-
dents to practice law because large percentages do not intend to do so,
professional skills courses and clinics are generally not offered.228
Clinics exist in some Latin American countries229 and exist in the ma-
jority of law schools in Chile.230  Although instruction in interest-
based negotiation, interviewing, and counseling occurs in classroom
components of these clinics,231 few separate courses provide non-adju-
dicatory learning opportunities .232
This shared educational deficiency contributes to U.S. and
Latin American lawyers’ resistance to mediating commercial disputes.
While mediating involves using knowledge of applicable laws and ad-
judicatory procedures to analyze cases and predict outcomes, media-
tion also requires skilled performance of many other, different tasks,
including emotional awareness and responsiveness.  Many, if not
most, U.S. and Latin American lawyers find that representing clients
225 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 164; Welsh, supra note 171, at 50.
226 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 164.
227 See Alain Lempereur, Negotiation and Mediation in France:  The Challenge of
Skill-Based Learning and Interdisciplinary Research in Legal Education, 3 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 151, 164 (1998).
228 Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1079-80. But see Pinto, supra note 207, at 65 (ex-
plaining that the University of Buenos Aires School of Law offers a first cycle of
law study designed to provide learning and teaching activities that promote “rea-
soning, legal reading, critical analysis from a legal standpoint as well as an under-
standing of other perspectives such as finding a solution or [achieving] an
alternative dispute resolution method”).
229 Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1080.
230 Wilson, supra note 179, at 536.
231 Id. at 541, 566-67.
232 See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1103 (recommending that U.S. and Latin Ameri-
can legal curricula include discussion of the approaches and attitudes of civil and
common law negotiation and mediation).
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before and during mediation effectively challenges them to perform en-
tirely different tasks than they use when adjudicating.233  Many have
had little experience, education, or practice in performing these tasks
skillfully.234  Many find it difficult to adapt their analytic tendencies
and win-lose biases to advocate for agreements rather than victo-
ries.235  This often produces counterproductive mediation actions that
ignore or respond ineffectively to emotions, jealously guard informa-
tion against even confidential disclosure in private sessions, seek to
maximize gain exclusively, resist broadening issues and perspectives,
and criticize excessively.236
B. Influences from Legal Cultural Differences
Moving from legal cultural similarities to differences, identify-
ing factors that influence lawyers’ resistance to mediate commercial
disputes gets harder for several reasons.  Latin American civil systems
differ in many respects from European237 and Asian counterparts,238
and variations exist within individual Latin American countries.239
233 How Business Conflict Resolution Is Being Practiced in China and Europe, 23
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 148, 149 (2005) (quoting a British barrister
who noted that for years he had been paid to disagree and suddenly he’s expected
to help clients and counterparts agree).
234 Legal, Commercial, and Cultural Obstacles to Mediation Within Europe, 23 AL-
TERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 98, 99 (2005) (noting that Italian lawyers do not
consider negotiation as something to be learned and are trained in litigation, not
negotiation, practices).
235 See Sternlight, supra note 140, at n.181 (quoting James C. Freund, Bridging
Troubled Waters: Negotiating Disputes, LITIG., Winter 1986, at 43-44 (arguing that
searching for agreements is “a hard road to travel without running the risk of
being seen as a softy who is reluctant to fight and ready to give away the store”));
Id. at 324 (suggesting that lawyers’ “cognitive characteristics do not necessarily
suit them well to engage in problem-solving ” negotiation).
236 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 216, at 427; Sternlight, supra note 140, at 323-24.
237 Genty, supra note 172, at 134.
238 See generally Hal Movius et al., Tailoring the Mutual Gains Approach for Ne-
gotiations with Partners in Japan, China, and Korea, 22 NEGOTIATION J. 389
(2006).
239 Leonard L. Cavise, The Transition from the Inquisitorial to the Accusatorial
System of Trial Procedure:  Why Some Latin American Lawyers Hesitate, 53
WAYNE L. REV. 785, 795 (2007) (“The inquisitorial model as adapted to the various
Latin systems retained the fundamental European characteristics, but with a
number of culturally or politically-dictated modifications in each Latin American
national system.”); Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1063 (noting that, unlike many other
Latin American countries, Mexico has “several important codifications in the pri-
vate sphere”); Genty, supra note 172, at 144 & n.49 (stating that public interest
litigation or cause lawyering does not exist in Mexico yet is found in Argentina,
Brazil, and Columbia).
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Moreover, how common and civil system attorneys practice differently
outside adjudication contexts has received little research attention,240
and their attitudes and actions regarding mediating commercial dis-
putes has received virtually none.  This is partially explained by medi-
ation’s recent arrival in civil law countries generally and in Latin
America particularly.241
The absence of comparative research also stems from the fact
that many common and civil law differences flow from variations in
how law is created, understood, and applied.  These differences have
little influence on mediating, which pursues outcomes independent of
law and legal doctrines.  For example, common law lawyers allegedly
approach law application challenges pragmatically, seek ways to work
around legal rules, and develop innovative, alternative arguments for
accomplishing client objectives in the face of apparent legal obsta-
cles.242  Civil lawyers, on the other hand, allegedly approach law appli-
cation challenges theoretically, focus on finding code-based answers,
and struggle to find creative, alternative arguments that circumvent
apparent legal roadblocks.243  Legal arguments in civil system courts
allegedly tend toward broad assertions that do not focus on key eviden-
tial and other details while common law court arguments tend to ex-
ploit specific facts and testimonial excerpts.244  Mediating, however,
does not involve applying law and making legal arguments.  Even if
these broad stereotypes have any validity, they exert virtually no in-
fluence on the widespread resistance to mediating commercial dis-
putes displayed by both common law and civil system lawyers.
Although many identifiable differences exist between how com-
mon and civil law system lawyers act in adjudication, the influence of
these differences on resistance to mediating diminishes because medi-
ation usually requires few tasks that attorneys perform while adjudi-
cating.  Lawyers typically perform fewer activities in inquisitorial civil
law systems where judges control adjudication from beginning to
end.245  In these systems, judges decide what evidence is necessary,
what documents should be presented, what lay and expert witnesses
need to be examined, whether oral testimony is needed or written sub-
missions suffice, and they conduct oral examinations subject to supple-
240 See Nadja Alexander, What’s Law Got To Do With It?  Mapping Modern Media-
tion Movements in Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions, 13 BOND L. REV. 335,
339-40 (2001); Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1056-57.
241 Alexander, supra note 240, at 339.
242 See id. at 356.
243 See id.
244 Cavise, supra note 239, at 810.
245 Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in Commercial International Arbi-
tration and Commercial Mediation, 75 TUL. L. REV. 913, 917 (2001).
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mentation by attorneys.246  U.S. lawyers, in contrast, decide what
witnesses to call and evidence to introduce, base proof extensively on
oral testimony that they either adduce before or at trial, determine
whether to retain and use expert witnesses, participate in jury selec-
tion, and engage in extensive pre-trial and trial motion advocacy.247
Efforts underway in many Latin American countries to move
their criminal law trial procedure from civil system inquisitorial to
common law accusatory have generated substantial resistance and re-
luctance among many lawyers.248  These changes, however, may not
quickly affect non-criminal adjudicatory systems used in commercial
dispute resolution.  Moreover, pre-trial discovery of testimony, docu-
ments, and other physical evidence seldom exists in civil law countries
while it comprises a major component of U.S. common law
adjudication.
Mediation removes formal persuasive arguments directed to-
ward decision-makers from the resolution process and avoids exten-
sive use of documents, evidentiary presentations, and examinations of
lay and expert witnesses.  Although systemic limits on actions lawyers
perform in civil system adjudication might lessen resistance to media-
tion for civil lawyers, they do not appear to have this impact.  No evi-
dence suggests that mediation attracts civil system lawyers as a way
to escape their more limited adjudicative roles as compared to those
performed by common law attorneys.  Nor does evidence suggest that
U.S. common law attorneys’ fact-oriented, client- and witness-based
litigation experiences influence them to prefer mediating over adjudi-
cating commercial disputes.
Economic considerations significantly influence lawyer resis-
tance to mediating.  Some U.S. lawyers fear that mediating brings eco-
nomic harm.249  Helping clients resolve commercial disputes provides
profitable activity for U.S. and Latin American lawyers who are not
full-time employees of the companies involved.250  Absent disputes
246 Genty, supra note 172, at 142.
247 Id. at 142.
248 Cavise, supra note 239, at 787.
249 25% of lawyers agreed that increasing mediation would decrease their per-
sonal compensation while 51% disagreed.  Lande, supra note 12, at 179-80.  Econo-
mists recognize that lawyers who are paid by the hour have short term interests in
prolonging disputes even if longer term interests in retaining future business or
gaining referrals from clients point the other way.  Sternlight, supra note 140, at
320.
250 YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:  INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
50-51 (1996); Peters, supra note 19, at 1295-96.
416 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:4
which facilitate charging outcome percentages as contingent fees,251
most U.S. lawyers bill their commercial clients by the hour for dispute
resolution work.
Adjudicating requires tasks emphasized by lawyers’ experience
and education.252 In the U.S. common law system these tasks often
include time consuming and lucrative pre-trial discovery, pre-trial mo-
tion advocacy and defense, lay and expert witness preparation and ex-
amination, and evidence gathering, preparation, and presentation.253
U.S. executives complain that hourly fee billing approaches create dis-
incentives for lawyers’ to mediate.254  Many also suggest that this is a
significant reason why more commercial disputes are not mediated.255
A recent U.S. study suggests that mediating frequently reduces
the amount of time lawsuits take to resolve.  Evaluating 15,000 non-
criminal, non-commercial lawsuits handled by Assistant U.S. Attor-
neys showed that using mediation saved an average of eighty-eight
lawyer hours per case.256  Although mediation often appears to reduce
hourly fee billing by saving time, law firm revenues do not necessarily
have to diminish as a result of using mediation.257 Using Alternative
Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) by mediating, usually ADR’s most effec-
tive form, does not need to connote an alarming drop in revenue for
attorneys.258  Lawyers can and should bill for time spent performing
the important tasks involved in helping clients prepare for and partici-
pate in mediation.259  In addition, lawyers may use value-based and
similar bonus approaches that reward them for achieving timely, effec-
251 These fees are most often one third of amounts settled before beginning litiga-
tion and 40% afterwards. See, e.g., Fla. Rule Professional Conduct 4-1.5(f) (setting
these amounts as the upper limits of what meets the required standards that fees
must be reasonable).
252 Peters, supra note 19, at 1296.
253 See Stewart Levine, Breaking Down Costs:  What are You Losing by Not Using
ADR, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 235, 235 (2001).  In 2000 an estimated
$400 billion in litigation costs were incurred in the more than 22 million cases that
were filed in the United States. Id.
254 McEwen, supra note 30, at 11 (quoting general counsel who believes hourly
billing blocks early, inexpensive settlements and encourages lawyers to do things
slowly).
255 Business Mediation, From All Points of View, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 101, 104 (2006).
256 Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial:
Comparing Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 225, 252 (2009).
257 Peters, supra note 19, at 1298.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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tive, high quality outcomes in fixed price, retainer, and hourly billing
contexts.260
Similar economic concerns influence civil system lawyers, even
though they may not depend on hourly billing.261  Latin American at-
torneys express concerns that mediation brings economic disincentives
and that adjudicating pays but mediating does not.262  An EU media-
tor noted that the primary challenge to implementing the EU cross-
border mediation directive is to make mediating financially attractive
for lawyers, not clients.263  Fear of lost income from more mediation
and less litigation has generated lawyer resistance in Denmark264 and
Scotland, a mixed civil and common law country.265  An instinct to pre-
serve their dominant roles in dispute resolution and to avoid losing
income could explain lawyer resistance to greater use of mediation in
Italy.266 When designing mediation systems, legislators and judges
must avoid creating direct economic disincentives to mediating com-
mercial disputes.267
260 See NANCY NELSON & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, COMMERCIAL MEDIATION IN EU-
ROPE: BETTER SOLUTIONS FOR BUSINESS 9 (2004) (arguing that to retain increas-
ingly cost-conscious clients, and win new ones, lawyers need to prove themselves
as skilled early dispute resolvers and solution providers as well as good adjudica-
tion advocates); Mark Wolf, Update: How Value Billing Helps Both the Client and
the Law Firm, 28 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 7 (2010) (describing value-
based approach that enhances budgeting and delivers cost effective, high quality
legal services).
261 See Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions, in LAWYERS
IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 80, 110 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. Lewis
eds., 1989) (noting that mandatory fees are fixed by the state in all matters in
Germany, advisory fee schedules are set by the state in Italy, and advisory fee
schedules are established by the legal profession in Norway, Brazil, France, Spain,
and Japan).
262 Phillips, supra note 176. (noting that the increased lawyer activity needed to
gather information preparing for mediation that requires consent to succeed fully
both stretches civil system lawyers to perform tasks they are not accustomed to
and creates risks that their clients might not understand why they need to pay for
this work).
263 EU Backs Cross-Border Mediation, supra note 26, at 122-23.
264 Vibeke Vindelov, Mediation in Danish Law: In Retrospect and Perspective, in
GLOBAL MEDIATION TRENDS, supra note 25, at 123, 131.
265 Margaret L. Ross, Mediation in Scotland: An Elusive Opportunity, in GLOBAL
MEDIATION TRENDS, supra note 25, at 305, 329.
266 De Palo & Harley, supra note 61, at 476. The Italian fee structure, which is
based primarily on the number of briefs and hearings, is a further incentive to not
use mediation.  Giuseppe De Palo & Luigi Cominelli, Mediation in Italy: Waiting
for the Big Bang?, in GLOBAL MEDIATION TRENDS, supra note 25, at 259, 262.
267 For example, Germany used a system where legal costs insurance paid for ad-
judication but not mediation fees leaving this expense entirely on clients and dis-
couraging them and their lawyers from mediating.  Alexander, supra note 240, at
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Additional evidence that legal system differences do not affect
resistance to mediating flows from how economic factors similarly in-
fluence lawyers in both common law and civil systems, even though
adjudicatory risks frequently differ in each.  Risks of negative out-
comes in civil system adjudication are usually not as strong as they are
in U.S. courts.  The absence of juries removes much of the frightening,
risky unpredictability that exists in U.S. common law litigation.268
Predicting outcomes from a single, legally trained decision-maker is
usually easier than predicting what a group of non-legally sophisti-
cated people will do.  Damages in civil law system adjudication are
generally lower than similar awards in U.S. common law adjudica-
tion.269 Transactional costs are usually smaller in civil countries be-
cause of less pre-trial civil discovery costs and other attorney fee
expenditures. A civil system tradition requiring losing parties to pay
prevailing litigant’s legal fees also often deters excessive transactional
costs.
As this analysis demonstrates, legal cultural differences be-
tween U.S. common law and Latin American civil lawyers exert slight
influence on attorneys’ resistance to mediate commercial cases found
in both systems.270 These legal cultural differences apply primarily to
adjudication, particularly litigation. Substantial differences in litiga-
tion procedures between common law adversarial and civil system in-
quisitorial traditions generate complications stemming from different
attorney, expert, and judicial roles, varying methods of presenting evi-
dence, and contrasting values accorded to oral testimony and previous
357.  Lawyer-mediators in a German mandatory mediation project complained
about low reimbursement they received under statutory rates, noting that they
could not afford to spend more than sixty minutes mediating even though agree-
ments would have been much more likely with a longer time period. Nadja Alexan-
der et al., Mediation in Germany: The Long and Winding Road, in GLOBAL
MEDIATION TRENDS, supra note 25, at 223, 247. Similarly, Poland’s court-con-
nected mediation scheme limits mediator compensation to an amount that dis-
courages mediation of significant commercial disputes that necessarily require
more than a few hours. See Sylwester Pieckowski, Using Mediation in Poland to
Resolve Civil Disputes: A Short Assessment of Mediation Usage from 2005-2008, 64
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 84, 84 (2009).
268 Dodson, supra note 198, at 141 (stating that civil law countries have not had
juries in non-criminal matters for centuries).
269 See id. at 146 (stating that few countries permit the same individualized focus
and wide variation that U.S. damage verdicts allow, and most civil law countries
prohibit punitive damages while U.S. law continues to permit them).
270 Christine Cervenak et al., Leaping the Bar: Overcoming Legal Opposition to
ADR in the Developing World, 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 6, 6 (1998) (stating that legal
cultural factors, whether arising out of civil law or common law systems, as well as
fears of negative pocketbook effects, often predispose lawyers to oppose
mediation).
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judicial decisions.271 These differences help explain why many cross
border controversies involving disputants from common and civil law
systems select arbitration rather than litigation.272  Mediation’s differ-
ent assumptions, goals, and processes, however, transcend different le-
gal systems and the legal cultural variations they generate.273 Its
potential advantages warrant more consideration than lawyers in both
systems often give, and this article concludes by analyzing how attor-
neys can ensure that this assessment occurs in all commercial
disputes.
V. CONCLUSION: IDENTIFY, EXPLAIN, AND ASSESS
MEDIATING IN EARLY STAGES OF
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
This large menu of emotional-brain and neural short-cut bi-
ases, combined with powerful legal cultural influences largely unaf-
fected by common and civil law system differences, explains why U.S.
and Latin American lawyers resist mediating commercial disputes.
This article concludes with reasons why more identifying, explaining,
and assessing the option of mediating makes sense. This helps com-
mercial lawyers and clients to counter all of the biases and cultural
influences previously described. It ensures that lawyers and their cli-
ents use their brain’s prefrontal cortex to subject this important deci-
sion to slow, conscious deliberation.274 It also helps manage escalating
dispute resolution budgets, and often produces faster, more business
interest-centered outcomes.
Overcoming mediation resistance begins with identifying medi-
ation as an option for resolving commercial disputes. Because of long-
standing traditions of viewing adjudication as simply what is done
when participants cannot negotiate commercial disputes successfully,
this initial step of consciously making a decision about mediating often
disappears.275 Lawyers, executives, and managers assume that they
have no other choice than to adjudicate.276 Failing to appreciate fully
the ways mediating differs from and is superior to unaided face-to-face
negotiation,277they assume that disputes cannot resolve consensually
271 Peters, supra note 19, at 1256.
272 Id. at 1255-58.
273 GLOBAL MEDIATION TRENDS, supra note 25, at 2; see Cervenak et al., supra note
270, at 6.
274 Lehrer, supra note 91, at 243-50 (proposing five general guidelines to improve
decision-making).
275 NELSON & STIPANOWICH, supra note 260, at 11.
276 Id.
277 Id. These advantages include using confidential caucuses to gather more and
better information combating selective perception; defusing strong emotions
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because they have already tried to negotiate them without success.
They also often fail to grasp how mediating “create[s] opportunities for
the parties to achieve many different kinds of goals and that it pro-
vides procedural tools” not offered by adjudication.278
The next step requires lawyers to question these assumptions
and restrain their automatic, habitual desires to adjudicate commer-
cial disputes.  As this article demonstrates, this is neither easy nor
common.  Lawyers in both systems enjoy monopoly status as persons
generally permitted to represent human and entity clients in lawsuits
and arbitrations.279  People like to sell to their strengths, and adjudi-
cating allows lawyers to market their primary product lines of knowl-
edge of legal rules, rights, remedies and defenses and ability to apply
this expertise in persuading external decision-makers.  Adjudication
emphasizes issue-oriented dispute resolution which focuses on legal
rule connections and applications.280
U.S. lawyers enjoy feeling in control and central to the ac-
tion.281  Adjudicating lets lawyers exercise control, play dominant
roles, and remain central to the endeavor until external decision-mak-
ers act.282  Lawyers usually prefer leading to following, and adjudicat-
ing requires them to lead as they plead claims and defenses, assemble
evidence, and present arguments.283  Clients usually defer to their
lawyer’s knowledge and expertise in these realms, and focusing inter-
actions on lawyers’ expertise lessens attorneys’ needs to share agendas
with their clients.284
breaking through partisan perceptions; countering optimistic overconfidence by
enhancing realistic forecasts of adjudicatory outcomes enabling better compari-
sons of them and negotiation proposals; expanding discussion agendas to include
business interests muting fixed pie and zero sum assumptions; and helping dispu-
tants assess shared interests in controlling resolutions, avoiding loss risks, and
saving further transactional costs as ways to confront win-lose biases.
278 Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil
Justice, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 227, 258.
279 See Abel, supra note 261, at 106.
280 Eric Ryan, Building the Emotionally Learned Negotiatior, 22 NEGOTIATION J.
209, 222 (2006).
281 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 160 n.84; Welsh, supra note 171, at 51.
282 Sternlight, supra note 140, at 339-45.
283 Peters, supra note 19, at 1296.
284 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002). For example, U.S. legal
ethical standards divide decision-making authority for the means client objectives
are pursued. Clients are expected normally to “defer to the special knowledge and
skill” of their lawyers, “particularly with respect to technical, legal, and technical
matters.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) cmt. (2002)  Many attorneys
interpret this to encompass the decisions needed to manage adjudication.
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“Lawyers like most people feel more comfortable with what
they know best”285 and resist performing actions that present more
challenge and produce less comfort.286  Change is never easy, and it
often generates fears of making mistakes and receiving negative judg-
ments.287  Lawyers must ensure that they do not reject mediation be-
cause it changes resolution process dynamics and gives them less
control, centrality, leadership, and opportunity to display legal knowl-
edge-based advocacy.  Lawyers must also resist inclinations to avoid
mediation because it puts them outside their comfort zone by requiring
actions that acknowledge and respond to the complicated, interactive
emotional dynamics that arise during dispute resolution.288
Mediation reduces lawyer control by substituting a less formal
consensual process that clients attend and may participate substan-
tially, for a more rule-bound adjudication approach where clients often
are not present, do not participate unless testifying, and transfer deci-
sion-making to judges, arbitrators, or juries.289 Mediating anticipates
larger roles for clients than they play in adjudicating.  Mediating typi-
cally requires clients to be present, and provides several opportunities
for them to talk and to listen in joint sessions when all disputants
meet together, and in confidential meetings conducted outside the
presence of all or some other participants.  Mediating gives commer-
cial clients the opportunity to hear counterparts’ perspectives directly
without distortion from their lawyers, interact directly with counter-
parts, and make informed comparisons between mediation options and
likely adjudication outcomes.290
While lawyers typically play central roles in the managed dis-
course of effective mediating,291 their actions occur in the presence of
and in collaboration with representatives of their commercial clients
and their counterparts.  For example, their analysis of case strengths,
weaknesses, and outcome forecasts are typically discussed confiden-
285 Guthrie, supra note 174, at 165.
286 Robert C. Bordone et al., The Next Thirty Years: Directions and Challenges in
Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 35, at
507, 511.
287 Millhauser, supra note 161, at 190.
288 See Ryan, supra note 280, at 213; see infra notes 313-21 and accompanying
text.
289 See Genty, supra note 172, at 142 (quoting Dutch lawyers who say that in
typical civil suits in the Netherlands it is thought to be too expensive to have cli-
ents testify, so absent significant disagreements, attorneys prepare and submit
written summaries of client and witness statements).
290 Sternlight, supra note 140, at 339.
291 Riskin & Welsh, supra note 14, at 875 (noting that lawyers tend to dominate
discussions during court-connected mediations of ordinary non-criminal, non-fam-
ily disputes in the United States).
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tially yet in their client’s presence.  Because this presents risks of sur-
facing evidence gathering and evaluation errors, it often encourages
more preparation by lawyers than face-to-face negotiations.292  In ad-
dition, mediation lessens lawyers’ law-based expertise by integrating
consideration of non-monetary and other interests outside legal
frames, de-emphasizing determinations about applicable law, and
seeking outcomes about costs, benefits, and risks that parties can live
with.293  Mediating generates information for making cost-benefit as-
sessments that commercial clients typically make in other facets of
their business operations.294  Finally, mediating challenges lawyers to
navigate emotional dynamics skillfully, managing themselves in the
midst of emotional stress while conducting effective professional inter-
actions with others who are often strongly influenced by emotions.295
Discussing mediation as a pre-adjudication option counters
brain-based and cultural biases and helps lawyers approach the chal-
lenging tasks of mediating.  Mediating combats selective perception by
demonstrating that dispute contexts contain more solution-relevant
information than legal analysis identifies.  For example, determining
whether to mediate requires identifying and assessing whether signifi-
cant actual or potential commercial relationships or other business in-
terests exist.296  This encourages evaluating the importance clients
place on publicity, confidentiality, and obtaining relief that adjudica-
tion cannot provide, such as apologies, modified relations, expedited
compliances, licensing agreements, equipment sharing arrangements,
barter arrangements, bid invitations, and future references.297  This
also emulates efforts by mediators to shift focus from the parties and
their inclinations to maximize gain against each other to solving to-
gether commercial problems.298
Mediating combats fixed pie and zero sum biases by expanding
resolution agendas to include these and other types of business and
non-monetary interests.  Commercial actors probably value and priori-
tize business and non-monetary interests differently.299  These differ-
292 See Sternlight, supra note 140, at 340.
293 See Alexander, supra note 240, at 356-57.
294 James C. Freund, Three’s A Crowd: How to Resolve a Knotty Multi-Party Dis-
pute Through Mediation, 64 BUS. LAW. 359, 362-63 (2009).
295 Ryan, supra note 280, at 210.
296 Screening Device Determines ADR Suitability, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 7 (1997) [hereinafter Suitability Screening Device].
297 Id. at 8.
298 Falcao & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 418.
299 Expanding resolution agendas to include these specific types of commercial in-
terests encourage trading, the most common approach to creating value in media-
tion.  Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in
Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 134-35, 137.
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ently valued and prioritized possibilities generate value-creating
agreement opportunities by trading relatively lesser for relatively
more valued options.300  Mediating also provides opportunities to
broaden understandings of how counterparts view disputes, business
interests, potential trades, and the impacts that these perspectives
have on monetary remedies that are or might be asserted in
adjudication.301
Many commercial disputes present situations where considera-
tions external to the monetary claims primarily drive decisions.302
Even when assessing just win-lose outcomes on legal claims involving
money damages, however, mediating helps lawyers and their commer-
cial clients realize that they lack perfect information upon which to
base their case analyses and outcome forecasts.303  Effective lawyers
understand that they do not know or understand everything relevant
to analyzing and forecasting adjudication outcomes.304  They also
know that selective and partisan perception lessens their analytic ob-
jectivity and increases risks of biased predictions.305  Mediating cre-
ates balanced opportunities for commercial disputants and their
lawyers to speak about factors on which case analyses and outcome
forecasts are based with assurance that what they say and do will not
appear in court testimony or the media.306
Confidential caucusing allows private meetings with mediators
and frequently generates information that would never appear in adju-
dication but which often proves crucial to resolutions.307 Confidential
300 Id.
301 An analysis of many years of surveys regarding court-connected mediation in
the United States Federal Court for the Northern District of California showed
that 62% of lawyers believed mediation had helped parties indentify their underly-
ing interests, needs, and priorities beyond their legal positions.  Brazil, supra note
278, at 253.
302 Id. at 233.  Mediating allows disputants to learn that they are better off if they
focus virtually all solution-seeking activities on underlying interests, non-mone-
tary values, and longer-range visions. Id.
303 Sternlight, supra note 140, at 299.  This may challenge some Latin American
lawyers who may not have much experience in their litigation systems with devel-
oping information regarding their counterparts’ case. See Cavise, supra note 239,
at 806.
304 Brazil, supra note 278, at 232.
305 Id.
306 NELSON & STIPANOWICH, supra note 260, at 14.  This privacy protection is typi-
cally outlined in agreements to mediate and reinforced by legal rules supporting
the confidentiality of mediation generally. Id.
307 Id.  In a survey of federal mediation in the Northern District of California, 31%
of litigators reported that mediation explored resolutions beyond which courts
could order, and 38% said that mediation had clarified, narrowed, or eliminated
issues.  Brazil, supra note 278, at 253.
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caucuses overcome major barriers to resolution that flow from strate-
gic approaches to communication generated by adjudicating.308  Aris-
ing from win-lose and loss aversion biases, commercial disputants are
reluctant to disclose private information in order to maximize their
gain, increase their leverage, and avoid creating potential leverage
against them.309  With permission, and after disputants have had op-
portunities to share their perspectives, concerns, and analyses,
mediators frequently use this hoarded but often useful information in
indirect, disguised ways by offering hypothetical possibilities or mak-
ing suggestions.310
These enhanced communication channels that are possible in
mediation but not in adjudication help commercial decision-makers
move their understanding beyond selective perception by becoming
more familiar with and realistic regarding dispute facts, case analyses,
and outcome forecasts.311  They help commercial disputants avoid ne-
gotiation errors stemming from missing or misunderstanding impor-
tant facts, legal rules, possible agreement terms, and adjudicatory
outcome components.312
Mediating often defuses hostility between disputants and com-
bats the distortions caused by partisan perception and biased attribu-
tion.  Remembering this may help lawyers manage their discomfort
with dealing with the fluid emotional dynamics of mediated negotia-
tions.313  Negative, hostile emotions influence behavior, divert atten-
308 Sternlight, supra note 140, at 335-36.  In the California federal district court
study, 21% of litigants and 22% of their lawyers reported that they had bridged a
communication gap during the mediation.  Brazil, supra note 278, at 252.
309 J. ANDERSON LITTLE, MAKING MONEY TALK:  HOW TO MEDIATE INSURED CLAIMS
AND OTHER MONETARY DISPUTES 19-22 (2007).
310 Hoffman, supra note 209, at 25-26. An American Bar Association Section of
Dispute Resolution Task Force conducted ten focus group discussions in nine U.S.
cities and reviewed more than 100 questionnaire responses to compile a Final Re-
port on Improving Mediation Quality.  This Report found that 95% of respondents
felt it was essential, very important, or important that mediators make sugges-
tions, and 100% welcomed suggestions regarding possible ways to resolve issues.
ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION
QUALITY: FINAL REPORT 14 (2008) [hereinafter REPORT ON IMPROVING MEDIATION
QUALITY].
311 Suitability Screening Device, supra note 296, at 7.
312 Brazil, supra note 278, at 239.  Mediation discourse promotes two simple sug-
gestions offered to help decision-makers:  (1) always entertain competing hypothe-
ses, and (2) continually remind yourself of what you don’t know. LEHRER, supra
note 91, at 247.
313 Suitability Screening Device, supra note 296, at 7 (stating that the likelihood a
mediator could help defuse hostility between disputants, their lawyers, or both is a
factor suggesting suitability for mediation).
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tion from resolution, and damage relationships.314  Positive emotions
promote satisfying substantive interests, enhance relationships, and
reduce exploitation fears.315
Effective mediators seek to establish and maintain positive
emotional climates conducive to constructive communication.316  They
frequently respond to core emotional concerns by expressing apprecia-
tion, building affiliation, respecting autonomy, and acknowledging sta-
tus.317 They strive to introduce “light where before there was only
heat”318 by acknowledging strong emotions that disputants often ex-
press.319  This permits participants to express negative emotions, usu-
ally in caucus out of the presence of counterparts.320  Discussing topics
triggering strong emotions in private sessions allows full expression
without alienating counterparts.  These conversations counter biased
attribution by disentangling impact from intent.321  They also often
generate useful information that clarifies interests and aids careful
analysis of the costs and benefits of mediation alternatives.
Mediating commercial cases combats overconfidence because it
typically encompasses frank and mutual analysis of alternatives to
agreeing consensually.  Comparing what emerges as the best terms
achievable during mediating with these alternatives is a core compo-
314 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 223, at 5, 11-12.
315 Id. at 7-8.
316 See id. at 214-15 (stating that good feelings widen perception and helps people
think more flexibility, take in situation’s larger implications, think more in terms
of relationship, and connect more dots); GALLAGHER, supra note 103, at 37; Ryan,
supra note 280, at 221 (stating that positive emotions facilitate creative problem
solving in negotiation and enhance creativity and rapport).
317 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 223, at 15-21.
318 NELSON & STIPANOWICH, supra note 260, at 15.
319 Acknowledging feelings is usually a pre-requisite to problem-solving. STONE
ET AL., supra note 119, at 106.  Neutral, non-judgmental statements that commu-
nicate that listeners hear and understand emotions are the most effective way to
acknowledge feelings. BINDER ET AL., supra note 184, at 52-61.  Doing this signals
that speakers’ and their emotions matter. STONE ET AL., supra note 119, at 106.
320 GOLANN &  FOLBERG, supra note 6, at 195 (stating that sometimes simply al-
lowing disputants to vent their feelings privately is enough to clear the air); Amy
L. Lieberman, The “A” List of Emotions in Mediation:  From Anxiety to Agreement,
61 DISP. RESOL. J. 46, 48 (2006) (stating that acknowledging strong feelings tends
to “take some of the juice out of them”).
321 Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory
and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 304-08 (2006)  (describing inter-
ventions mediations make to help disputants combat attribution errors); see
STONE ET AL., supra note 119, at 44, 53-55 (arguing that  intentions strongly influ-
ence judgments humans make of others and that humans judge others more
harshly if they intended to harm than if they did so for other reasons).
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nent of commercial dispute mediation.322  Effective mediators promote
the development of greater information regarding mediation alterna-
tives by discussing, usually in caucuses, strengths, weaknesses, gaps,
inconsistencies, and vulnerabilities concerning specific dimensions of
anticipated mediation goals.323
Because commercial dispute resolution usually occurs in the
shadow of adjudicatory alternatives, much of this conversation con-
cerns specific information regarding case analyses and outcome fore-
casts.  Typically occurring after disputants have presented their views,
concerns, and opinions fully, these conversations often begin with dis-
cussions of analytic strengths and bases of favorable predictions.324
Listening carefully, mediators can convert this information into ques-
tions to ask counterparts regarding potential vulnerabilities and
weaknesses in their legal positions and outcome forecasts.
Mediators then tactfully phrase and respectfully ask these
questions.325 Responding to these inquiries permits counterparts to
learn and assess these contrasting perspectives.  Using questions
rather than statements allows mediators to encourage lawyers to ar-
ticulate responses to inquiries about potential gaps, inconsistencies,
and problems.326  This dialogue allows commercial clients to hear pros
and cons of adjudicatory analyses and predictions discussed in non-
adversarial, information-oriented rather than persuasion-focused, set-
tings.327  These discussions often help clients understand why and
how they need to adjust their views of adjudicatory outcomes in order
to form more realistic expectations of settlement possibilities and
proposals.328
322 Brazil, supra note 278, at 239.
323 Korobkin, supra note 113, at 69.
324 95% of respondents indicated that mediators’ reviewing case strengths and
weaknesses is helpful in half or more of the cases they mediated. REPORT ON IM-
PROVING MEDIATION QUALITY, supra note 310, at 14.
325 95% of respondents reported that mediators’ asking pointed questions that
raised issues is helpful in half or more of the cases which they mediated. Id.
326 Korobkin, supra note 113, at 69.  Participating in this discourse might chal-
lenge Latin American lawyers who are not accustomed to having real control over
the presentation and development of investigation and trial of matters. See
Cavise, supra note 239, at 790.
327 CARROLL & MACKIE, supra note 4, at 23-24.  Commercial clients sometimes
complain that their lawyers never discuss case weaknesses and instead focus only
on strengths.  Stephen P. Younger, Effective Representation of Corporate Clients in
Mediation, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 951, 957 (1996).
328 Brazil, supra note 278, at 232.  Gaining clearer understandings of the
strengths of each other’s claims often narrows gaps between disputants’ outcome
forecasts and encourages settlement.  Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psycho-
logical Barriers to Litigation Settlement  An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 107, 128 n.86 (1994).
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Finally, mediating counters the perceptual and legal cultural
win-lose biases that influence the strategic ways lawyers typically ne-
gotiate money-based issues.  Most commercial disputes involve at least
some negotiating over money and mediators add considerable value by
helping participants deal with optimistically overconfident case analy-
ses and the negative emotions that positional bargaining between dif-
fering perspectives frequently generates.329  Mediating dampens the
use and effects of ineffective but common negotiating tactics like un-
warranted threats, dangerous bluffs, and premature “final offers.”330
Money-based negotiating typically involves multiple rounds of
offers and responses as participants move through their negotiation
ranges.331  Attempts to maximize gain and avoid loss influence ten-
dencies to start negotiating with extreme demands reflected in high or
lowball offers, often considerably above or below adjudication fore-
casts,332 and to stop bargaining before reaching their best numbers.333
Using skilled listening, questioning, and confidential caucusing,
mediators help all parties deal with negative emotions generated by
biased attributions that perceive evaluation differences as criticism
and strategic negotiating actions as disrespect.334 They also help par-
ticipants deal with the escalating impatience and frustration that ac-
companies grudging efforts to move to midpoints between opening
proposals.  Analyzing and evaluating claims is not easy, and mediating
helps lawyers avoid false negotiation failures during this process re-
sulting from guessing incorrectly about what they can achieve, postur-
ing too long, hiding real top or bottom limits too tenaciously, and
concluding further movement cannot be made without unacceptable
face loss.335
Although disputants’ best numbers usually do not overlap, me-
diating helps many commercial disputants find ways to bridge the
smaller gaps that usually appear once extensive negotiating identifies
viable ranges.336  Carefully examining estimates regarding all trans-
actional costs of pursuing adjudicatory alternatives, including attor-
329 See LITTLE, supra note 309, at 85-109; Brazil, supra note 278, at 232.
330 Freund, supra note 294, at 363 n.5.
331 LITTLE, supra note 309, at 25-28. See generally  J. Michael Keating, Mediating
in the Dance for Dollars, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 93 (1996).
332 LITTLE, supra note 309, at 47, 128-9.
333 Id. at 30-31.
334 Id. at 86-89.
335 Brazil, supra note 278, at 239-40.
336 LITTLE, supra note 309, at 190-92.  98% of respondents viewed persistence as
an essential, very important or important quality in mediators and 93% identified
patience in the same way. REPORT ON IMPROVING MEDIATION QUALITY, supra note
310, at 17.  They expressed “dissatisfaction with mediators who threw in the towel
when negotiations became difficult.” Id.
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neys fees, court costs, business disruption expenses, lost commercial
opportunities, time estimates, collection probabilities, and appellate
risks, often helps bridge these gaps.337  Analyzing shared interests in
ending disputes, avoiding loss risks, and maximizing independent bus-
iness interests further bridge these gaps.  Mediating helps commercial
clients assess carefully whether adjudicating is really necessary and
cost-beneficial to achieve vindication, secure company reputations, re-
duce the incidence of future similar or related claims, or obtain deci-
sive legal precedent.338  Even if agreement does not result, mediating
often increases mutual understanding, resolves many issues, and nar-
rows the focus for going forward with either adjudication or later
mediation.339
Globalization, regional economic integration, and increased
business activity within the United States and Latin America amplify
the need to resolve commercial disputes with greater efficiency.  Law-
yers in these countries need to develop heightened awareness of adju-
dication alternatives and the promise they hold to create mutually
satisfactory, business interest-based resolutions.  Pre- or early-adjudi-
cation mediation, while not a panacea, supplies a valuable tool that
enhances efficient commercial dispute resolution when used more
often by lawyers and their business clients.
Mediating builds onto existing lawyer skills needed to analyze
fact situations, discern applicable law, and estimate adjudicatory out-
comes.340  Mediating gives lawyers important roles in helping their
commercial clients develop, compare, and then choose between ac-
cepting the best settlement option or initiating or continuing adjudica-
tion.341  Mediating also lets lawyers satisfy human impulses for
resolution, healing individuals and organizations, and enabling com-
merce to function more harmoniously and productively.342
Humans are profoundly social beings constantly influencing
and being influenced by each other.  Small-scale activities by a few in-
dividuals can generate contagious behaviors that cross a tipping point
337 Peters, supra note 19, at 1284-86.
338 Suitability Screening Device, supra note 296, at 8.  Obtaining a precedent may
not be as important in Latin American countries where the value of case precedent
may be either non-existent or limited. See Cavise, supra note 239, at 794.
339 NELSON & STIPANOWICH, supra note 260, at 22.
340 See Guthrie, supra note 174, at 180; Welsh, supra note 171, at 52.
341 Lawrence M. Watson, Initiating the Settlement Process:  Ethical Considera-
tions, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, 7, 15 (Phyliss
Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002).
342 See Steven Keeva, Transforming Practices:  Finding Joy and Satisfaction in
the Legal Life XX (1999).
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and produce dramatic, immediate changes in social practices.343  The
tipping point for commercial dispute mediation probably occurs when
mediating happens so commonly that it becomes the regular option,
the default preference unless particular circumstances suggest other-
wise.344  As this analysis demonstrates, lawyers’ resistance to mediat-
ing commercial disputes has not approached such a tipping point.  But
if more lawyers identified and surmounted the barriers generating
their resistance to mediate, use of this beneficial adjudicatory alterna-
tive might approach or even cross this tipping point.  Shall we medi-
ate, or tango, or both?
343 See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT:  HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE
A BIG DIFFERENCE 9 (2002).
344 Matthias Prause, The Oxymoron of Measuring the Immeasurable:  Potential
and Challenges of Determining Mediation Developments in the U.S., 13 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 131, 133-34 (2008). Some signs suggest that movement in this di-
rection is underway.  Increasing numbers of U.S. lawyers handling commercial
disputes have recently affirmed their willingness to mediate in ways that explore
both adjudication analysis and  underlying business interests.  Riskin & Welsh,
supra note 14, at 924.
